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Abstract  
The involvement of local communities in crime prevention programmes emerged as an 
alternative strategy for fighting and preventing crime after the failure of the criminal justice 
system to control and deter criminal activities effectively. Governments across the globe 
regard local communities as key actors in fighting and preventing crime. Community 
participation in crime prevention has become a key strategy to improve safety and security. 
The main aim of this study is to explore the extent to which residents of Khayelitsha 
contribute to the maintenance of security and order in their area; and to investigate the extent 
to which residents are empowered to solve crime problems on their own.  
 
The framework of this study is grounded on theories of crime namely: occupational choice, 
social learning, and social disorganisation; and concepts such as crime, crime prevention, and 
community participation. The literature review of this study focuses crime situation in South 
Africa with emphasis on crime trends, costs of crime, determinants of crime, and attempts 
made by the South African government to fight and prevent crime at national and local 
government levels. The study used key informant in-depth interviews with representatives of 
anti-crime community-based organisations in Site B and as well as ordinary residents of Site 
B. Data of this study is largely qualitative although it is supplemented with quantitative data 
relating to crime statistics which was collected as secondary data.  
 
In this study, both narratives and crime statistics reveal that robbery and theft-related crimes, 
drug abuse, and assaults are among the most predominant crimes. All informants perceived 
poverty and the use of drugs and alcohol as root causes of crime in Site B. The residents 
contribute in preventing and fighting crime in Site B by engaging in the following activities: 
patrolling streets as volunteers in Community Policing Forums (CPF); and providing crime-
related information to anti-crime organisations such as South African Police Service (SAPS), 
South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), and Khayelitsha Development Forum 
(KDF). The residents also get involved in crime prevention informally by exercising informal 
social sanctions. However, challenges such as ineffectiveness of the law enforcement and 
lack of financial support hinder the residents’ participation in crime prevention. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction  
Community participation in crime prevention gained prominence in the 1970s after 
mainstream criminal justice systems were adjudged to have failed in their ability to maintain 
security and order. Before the 1970s, the role of civilians in controlling and maintaining 
security and order in their areas remained largely unrecognised (Ren, et al., 2006). Fighting 
and preventing criminal activities was regarded as the work of law enforcers and other 
components of the criminal justice system. The collaboration between police and local 
communities has now emerged as a key strategy of crime prevention after the realization that 
the criminal justice system could not tackle crime alone. This study seeks to understand the 
role of local communities in crime prevention to ensure their communities are safe. The study 
provides insights into community driven crime prevention strategies in Site B, Khayelitsha as 
a case study. 
  
1.2 Background and Rationale  
High crime rates in South Africa have a long history, traceable to the time of political 
instability under apartheid. South Africa has been ranked among the top countries in terms of 
high crime rates and violence in the world (Demombynes and Özler, 2005; Møller, 2005; 
Paulse and Lazarus, 2010). In 2010 for example, Global Peace Index (GPI) ranked South 
Africa 121 out of 149 countries with the least peaceful societies and it moved only two places 
up from number 123 out of 144 countries (Ratele, 2010). These high crime rates have a 
negative impact on the quality of life and the economy. A large proportion of South Africans 
has suffered the effects of crime, directly or indirectly. In effect, many South Africans rate 
crime as the most serious national problem (Brown, 2001).  
 
Against the background of these high levels of crime, the South African government has 
pledged to improve security and safety for all South Africans. The government spending on 
crime forms now a large proportion of the national budget. In 2007 for example, the 
aggregated cost of crime in South Africa was estimated to be US$ 22.1 billion (7.8% of South 
Africa’s GDP) (Alda and Cuesta, 2010). Even though crime statistics show that crime rates 
are declining (SAPS, 2011), the government’s expenditure on crime prevention is unlikely to 
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decrease in the near future since the crime rates are still relatively high and the criminal 
justice system remains ineffective and corrupt (Brown, 2001, Singh, 2005; Monagham, 2008; 
Faull, 2011). In recognition of the pandemic, the South African government has also 
recognised that combating crime cannot be successful without the support of all stakeholders 
including the public. It is now appealing to the public to work closely with their police in the 
form of community policing to ensure their communities are safe.  
 
Several studies in other countries such as the USA reveal that crime rates are usually higher 
in big cities compared to small towns and rural areas (Sampson, 1986; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 
1996; Cullen and Levitt, 1999; Weijters, Scheepers and Gerris, 2009). Similarly, criminal 
activities in South Africa are also concentrated in big cities such as Cape Town, Durban, and 
Johannesburg. Cape Town, Khayelitsha in particular, is regarded as one of the crime hotspots 
in the country. In fact, Cape Town has one of the highest murder rates in the world (Gie, 
2009). In 2006, the United Nations put Cape Town on the list of the ‘high-risk’ cities and 
Cape Town was on a par with Rio de Janeiro (United Nations, 2006, cited in Gie, 2009). 
Within Cape Town, most criminal incidents occur in the townships such as Nyanga, 
Mitchell’s Plain, with Khayelitsha having the highest rate. Khayelitsha contributes 
significantly to murders and armed robbery in Cape Town (Kagee and Frank, 2005) and is 
one of the most violent urban areas in South Africa (Nleya and Thompson, 2009).  
 
1.3 Research problem 
While crime is a colossal challenge to democratic South Africa (Burger, 2007: 233), fighting 
crime largely remains the work of government through the criminal justice system. The South 
African criminal justice system, including law enforcement, has largely been weak and 
ineffective in deterring criminal activities (Singh, 2005; Faull, 2011). The country has a 
number of crime prevention policies that have been implemented at national and local levels. 
However, these policies seem to have concentrated resources on reacting to crime incidents 
instead of simultaneously addressing the root causes of crime (Newham, 2005; Dixon, 2006).  
 
Even though crime prevention in South Africa is based on the community policing approach 
in which the police partner with their local communities (Republic of South Africa (RSA), 
2009), the inclusion of the local community in crime prevention programmes has been given 
little attention. The potential of the combined effort of local communities and law 
enforcement agencies has been undermined, ignoring that criminal activities are deterred 
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most effectively when communities and law enforcement officers work collectively (Fagan 
and Meares, 2008). Based on the assumption that local people know their problems and areas 
better than external people (Liebermann and Coulson, 2004), and that criminals often live and 
operate within their own communities, involving local communities in controlling and 
maintaining security and order is a viable strategy.  
 
1.4 Objectives of the study  
The central objective of this study was to investigate the level of community involvement and 
empowerment in Site B, Khayelitsha in fighting crime. In addition to the central objective 
above, a number of ancillary objectives were set and these are to:  
i. Identify common crimes in Khayelitsha and assess their prevalence; 
ii. Assess residents’ attitudes, perceptions and willingness to get involved in improving 
safety and security in their area;  
iii. Explore strategies adopted by residents to prevent crime and identify key challenges;  
iv. Describe the level and form of cooperation between local residents and police.   
1.5 Research questions 
This study intends to answer the following research questions: 
i. What are the predominant crimes in Khayelitsha? 
ii. What are residents’ perceptions, attitudes, and willingness to participate in crime 
prevention?  
iii. What are the approaches adopted by residents to prevent crime effectively and 
what are the challenges that residents face? 
iv. What is the nature of the interaction and collaboration between police and 
residents? 
v.  How and to what extent do community members contribute to fighting and 
preventing crime? 
vi. To what extent are community members empowered to solve crime problems? 
 
1.6 Description of Khayelitsha 
This section provides a detailed description of Khayelitsha as a whole whilst a description of 
Site B is provided in chapter four, section 4.2. Khayelitsha is situated about 35 km from Cape 
Town city centre. It was constructed as a new township for black people in early 1983 
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(Business Trust and RSA, 2007). Khayelitsha was established with limited public amenities 
as it was apartheid’s policy to under-develop areas designated for black people. In addition, 
the township was isolated due to the distance from Cape Town city centre and other 
economic opportunities. In spite of these uncomfortable conditions, coupled with apartheid’s 
policy of controlling and restricting black people within the Western Cape, black people 
continued to migrate at an increased rate into the Western Cape. Khayelitsha expanded 
gradually but the township experienced an increase in growth after the abolition of apartheid 
in 1994. The township is now Cape Town’s biggest township and the second largest township 
in the country with a population of 406779 in 2005 (Business Trust and RSA, 2007).  
 
In the post-apartheid era, Khayelitsha residents, like other black Africans, expected the 
freedom dividend in the form of positive socio-economic changes. While extensive 
infrastructural development has occurred, Khayelitsha is still among the poorest communities 
in the Western Cape (Thompson and Conradie, 2010) with the majority of the Khayelitsha 
population living in crowded conditions with 7748 inhabitants/km2. The 2001 Census showed 
that more than 64% of the Khayelitsha population live in shacks. The 2001 Census also 
revealed that almost three quarters (70%) of the Khayelitsha population is under 30 years 
while only 35% are employed, and almost one third is not economically active (Business 
Trust and RSA, 2007). The average monthly income per household is R 1606 for an average 
household size of four people (City of Cape Town, 2006). 
 
1.7 Chapter outline  
Chapter two ‘Community and crime prevention: conceptual and theoretical framework’ 
conceptualizes crime and crime prevention, and it theorizes causes of crime with emphasis 
on: occupational choice theory – which hypotheses that crimes are committed with the 
intention of maximising economic benefit from committed crimes; social learning theory – 
which assumes that criminal behaviours are not inborn but learnt by interacting with or 
imitating inappropriate individuals who may be social role models or peers; and on social 
disorganisation theory – which argues that crimes are caused by the social disorganisation 
which exists in communities. The chapter also provides insight into the role of local 
communities in fighting crime.  
         
Chapter three ‘Crime in South Africa: trends, costs, and response’ reviews the literature on 
crime in South Africa, drawing attention to crime trends in South Africa, starting at the time 
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of apartheid. The chapter also highlights the cost of crime to individuals and households, 
businesses, and the costs of crime to the government. In addition, the chapter discusses 
factors that influence the individual to pursue criminal activities, and implemented policies 
which fight and prevent crime at national and local government levels.      
 
Chapter four ‘Methodology’ provides insights into the research process. It describes and 
justifies why qualitative and quantitative methods were used. The chapter also provides a 
description of how informants of this study were selected and justifies why in-depth 
interviews were used to collect data. Furthermore, the chapter outlines the steps followed to 
analyse data.    
 
Chapter five ‘Mapping crime in Site B, Khayelitsha’ focuses on the crime situation in the 
study area, Site B. In this chapter, much attention is given to the prevalence of crime, 
predominant crimes and their trends based on crime statistics. The chapter also provides a 
discussion on the root causes of crime based on the informants’ experience and perceptions 
towards crime.  
   
Chapter six ‘Community involvement in crime prevention in Site B’ provides insight into the 
contribution of Site B residents to anti-crime organizations including CPF, SAPS, KDF, and 
SANCO, operating in Site B. The chapter also provides an analysis of how the residents 
contribute to fighting and preventing crime by using informal social sanctions.      
 
Chapter seven ‘Conclusions’ provides a review of the findings, highlighting and reflecting on 
the key issues which emerged to show the extent to which the study answered the research 
problem and how the research objectives were achieved.  
 
 
 
 
 6 
Chapter 2 
Community and crime prevention: conceptual and theoretical framework  
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides the conceptual and theoretical framework which underpins the 
understanding of crime, crime prevention, and community participation in crime prevention.            
Community involvement in crime prevention programmes is gaining momentum across the 
globe. This approach is now regarded as an indispensable element of the strategy to reduce 
crime incidents and prevent potential crimes. The essential role of local communities in the 
effective fight and prevention of crime drives from the assumption that local communities 
have a better knowledge of their areas than anyone else (Liebermann and Coulson, 2004).   
 
The chapter has three major sections: Section 2.2 conceptualises and defines crime from a   
social and legal perspective. The section also provides insight into the challenges of 
producing a universal definition of crime. Section 2.3 discusses three theories namely: 
occupational choice, social learning, and social disorganisation which explain the root causes 
of crime and explain why some communities experience higher crime rates than others. 
Section 2.4 conceptualises crime prevention. The section also discusses community 
participation in controlling and preventing crime and other deviant behaviours; and section 
2.5 conceptualises community participation in the context of crime prevention. The section 
discusses key factors that promote community participation in preventing and fighting crime 
whilst section 2.6 provides conclusions drawn from this chapter.  
 
2.2 Conceptualizing crime  
Crime is not a new phenomenon or concept in the community. Every community experiences 
crime although crime levels differ from community to community. Currently, there is no 
single universally accepted definition of crime. In fact, crime is socially and legally 
constructed by society, and thus each community has its own way of defining and perceiving 
crime. Two major perspectives of conceiving crime are discussed here, the social and legal 
perspectives.  From the social perspective, crime may be defined as any act or behaviour that 
is perceived to violate shared values and norms of a society or community. Each society or 
group of people have a set of fundamental values that may be regarded as regulations which 
every member has to learn and conform to (Bynum and Thompson, 1996). If members of the 
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community fail to conform to those values and regulations, they are regarded as criminals or 
deviants and are subject to sanctions.  
 
From the legal perspective, crime is an action that could be followed by criminal proceedings, 
having one of the types of outcome such as a punishment, known to follow these proceedings 
(Williams, 1961, cited in Feldman, 1993:3). Based on this legal definition of crime, it may 
also be argued that crime is legally constructed given that laws determine which acts are 
regarded as crime. Classical theorists posit that there will be no crime in the absence of laws 
and some actions may not be regarded as crimes if there are no laws that forbid those actions. 
Whilst classical theorists consider crime as normal behaviour outlawed by the state or a group 
of people, religious organisations such as churches, view crime as evil behaviour, the product 
of demons, demonic possession, or irrational thought (Henry and Lanier, 2001:3).  
 
For an individual to avoid committing crime, they have to be aware of how law defines 
crime. The problem of the legal definition of crime is that some people in society may not be 
aware of the laws governing them. Laws often reflect the views of, and are imposed by elite 
people in power, who may criminalise behaviours and activities that are against their interests 
at the expense of the majority. In South Africa for example, the apartheid regime criminalised 
Africans, who are the majority, by passing a law which forbade them from living in white 
areas.  To ensure legitimacy the legal definition of crime may require the consensus of the 
majority while ensuring that the concerns of the majority are considered rather than 
disregarded. Outlawing actions that harm or injure the minority is the major challenge of the 
legal definition of crime (Henry and Lanier, 2001:3). On the other hand, defining crime based 
on social shared values of the majority may still be biased in a multicultural society because 
the social values of the minority may be disregarded.   
 
2.3 Theorizing causes of crime 
For decades, different disciplines such as criminology, economics, sociology and psychology 
have been trying to explain why individuals pursue criminal activities. As a result, many 
different theories of crime have been developed (Bandura, 1969; Lebow and Stein, 1989; 
Sampson and Groves, 1989). This section provides a discussion of the following theories: 
occupational choice, social learning, and social disorganisation.  
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2.3.1 Crime as an occupation of choice 
The Occupational choice theory has been used by economists to explain why individuals 
choose to pursue criminal activities rather than conform to the laws and widely shared social 
values in their communities. The theory links crime to income distribution or the well-being 
of community residents (Akers, 1990; Demombynes and Özler, 2005). According to 
economists, individuals choose to pursue criminal activities due to the economic benefits that 
are gained from illegitimate activities (Brown, 2001; Becker, 1968). The occupational choice 
theory is grounded on two assumptions: the first assumption is that individuals face resources 
scarcity; and the second assumption is that individuals always choose the occupation that 
maximizes their well-being (Brown, 2001).  
 
Occupational choice theorists argue that individuals prefer illegitimate activities as long as 
the returns from these activities are higher than the returns from legitimate activities (Brown, 
2001; Becker, 1968). However, there are some instances in which criminals undertake a 
combination of legitimate and illegitimate activities (Brown, 2001). Consistent with this 
argument, Machin and Meghir (2000, cited in Demombynes and Özler, 2005) found that 
criminals are more likely to come from the bottom end of the wage distribution. The 
implication is that people who earn low wages from legal activities might choose to engage in 
criminal activities as a way of supplementing their returns from legitimate activities. Given 
that people prefer to pursue an occupation that maximizes returns, the choice of occupation 
that yields the highest economic benefit is less likely to be crime if a wide range of 
occupations are available to choose from. Economics and sociology theorists posit that 
people are rational and they always make a choice after making calculations (Slocum, 1959; 
Nagin and Paternoster, 1993; Ulen, 1999, Brown, 2001; Mann and Mante, 2004). In terms of 
crime, these calculations involve a cost-benefit analysis which is undertaken by a potential 
criminal to decide whether committing a particular crime generates high returns. Crime is 
mostly committed if the net benefits of committing such a crime are expected to be higher 
than its costs (Brown, 2001).  
 
The assumption of rationality leads occupational choice theorists to propose that people’s 
choice of an occupation is not by accident but through the influence of some powerful 
stimulus that is beyond their control (Slocum, 1959). The influences affecting occupational 
choice decision-making could be: (i) personal attributes such as size, strength, good health, 
capacities, interests and aptitudes since some occupations may require certain physical 
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characteristics; (ii) impersonal values and cultural factors; and (iii) perceived interpersonal 
relationships. Taking into account these influences on decision-making, it is argued that an 
individual makes three thorough analyses before taking a firm decision to commit a crime: 
the first analysis is a scan of the availability of crime targets or potential crime victims.  
 
Potential criminals have to analyse whether the available crime targets are likely to provide 
maximum benefits if the crime is committed as (Brown, 2001) argues that a crime is 
committed if the anticipated benefits are high. The second analysis relates to the ability of the 
potential criminal themselves measured in terms of terms of strength, size, intelligence, and 
state of health, among others. Some crimes may require special skills or physical strengths 
compared to others. The third analysis relates to the suitability of the environment in which 
the crime is to occur. In relation to this, environmental factors such as availability of friends, 
cultural impediments, strength of the criminal justice system, visibility, and other constraints 
enable individuals to commit crimes.  
 
2.3.2 Non-conforming behaviours are learnt not congenital  
Every community has its own set of institutions which determine the expected social 
behaviour of each and every individual in that community. The process of acquiring new 
institutions or behaviours is explained in the theory of social learning which was developed 
by Bandura (Hart and Kritsonis, 2006). The theory proposes that criminal behaviours are not 
inborn but they are acquired like any other kind of behaviours. Social learning theory has 
been used extensively to explain how individuals acquire criminal behaviour (Krohn, et al., 
1985; Akers and Lee, 1996; Krohn, 1999; Akers and Jensen, 2003).  
 
The link between criminal behaviour and social learning theory is grounded on the hypothesis 
that the acquisition of deviant behaviour and conforming behaviour follow the same learning 
process (Akers and Lee, 1996). Accordingly, individuals learn the deviant behaviours in a 
similar fashion to how they learn the conforming behaviours, depending on the consequences 
attached to the behaviours which individuals opt to learn. These consequences may be 
rewards or punishments. The theory proposes that individuals learn new behaviour through 
interaction, imitation or the modelling of other’s behaviour (Bandura, 1969; Krohn, et al., 
1985). This suggests that an individual becomes a criminal if he/she interacts with criminals 
and imitates their behaviours and that the individuals’ behaviours are strongly influenced by 
the behaviours of their friends, family members, peers or models.  
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However, individuals do not choose to learn behaviours with no purpose. Rather individuals 
learn a particular behaviour after balancing the potential rewards or punishments attached to 
that behaviour. As the rational theory proposes, people are rational and they choose acts that 
always maximise gains (Lebow and Stein, 1989), people may learn behaviours that are 
expected to yield more profit or behaviours that are likely to bring less punishment.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that individuals pursue criminal activities because those 
activities are expected to bring more profits compared with legitimate activities. 
 
2.3.3 Social organisation as a determinant of community participation  
Crime has been consistently linked to social structures. Literature shows that there is a strong 
correlation between community organisation and crime rates (Sampson and Groves, 1989; 
Saegert and Winkel, 2004; Weijters, Scheepers and Gerris, 2009). This literature supports 
Shaw and McKay’s (1942 cited in Sampson and Groves, 1989) theory of disorganisation 
which states that communities with a high degree of organisation experience low crime rates 
whilst disorganised communities experience high crime rates. Social disorganisation was 
defined as the ‘inability of a community structure to realise the common values of its 
residents and maintain effective social control (Sampson and Groves, 1989).  
 
This theory is grounded on the assumption that communities with a low quality of 
organisation lack common values which may enable the community to collectively control 
and maintain security and order (Sampson and Groves, 1989; Kawachi, Kennedy, and 
Wilkinson, 1999; Steyn, de Beer and Fouché, 2009). Community social disorganisation 
weakens social cohesion which is a key component for achieving common interests. In the 
absence of informal sanctions such as condemnations and punishments, crimes and other 
non-conforming activities may be learnt, reinforced and normalised in the community. 
Informal sanctions against crime are reactions imposed by ordinary citizens. These sanctions 
include all detrimental consequences that convicted offenders suffer which are not formally 
specified by law or pronounced by the judge in the disposition (Benson, 1989).  
 
Informal social controls therefore, may play a significant role in reducing the amount of 
people who may acquire deviant behaviour. In the same vein, Fagan and Meares (2008) argue 
that deviant behaviour can be deterred and controlled by informal sanctions without involving 
formal sanctions such as legal punishments. Even though many people may see formal 
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sanctions as the right tool for deterring deviant behaviours, many studies show that these 
formal sanctions and other external institutions do not work effectively within disorganised 
communities. Formal sanctions work well only if they are paired with informal sanctions 
(Fagan and Meares, 2008; Jiang and Lambert, 2009).  
 
Informal sanctions can work effectively in various ways: inhibition of problem behaviours, 
facilitation of conformity, and restraint of social deviance once it appears (Fagan and Meares, 
2008). The ineffectiveness of formal sanctions could be due to the uncertainty of potential 
criminals being caught. As a result, potential criminals choose to commit crime because they 
know that there is little possibility of being caught. Another reason for the ineffectiveness of 
formal sanctions could be the assumption that individuals have enough knowledge of 
sanctions and the consequences of sanctions tied to a particular crime (Fagan and Meares, 
2008). The idea behind this assumption is that individuals may refrain from committing crime 
because they know the sanctions they may get if they are caught.  
 
While legal punishments play an important role in the prevention, informal sanctions such as 
shame, condemnation, stigma, and segregation imposed by family members, friends and 
neighbours, form yet other important deterrents. Empirical evidence in a social survey carried 
out by the British government on the consequence of arrest found that the majority of people 
do not consider the punishment associated with arrest as the most important consequence of 
arrest. Rather, they see informal sanctions such as shame, a tarnished reputation and a 
negative change in their relationship with family members and friends, as the most important 
consequence of arrest (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973, cited in Braithwaite, 1999:70).  
 
In disorganised communities, informal sanctions are weak and ineffective. The levels at 
which a community is disorganised or organised is measured by different features such as 
friendship, social networks, trust, hospitality, communalism, and the control of street teenage 
peer groups and offenders (Sampson and Groves, 1989). These features facilitate social 
cohesion and understanding among community residents and they allow residents to solve 
crime and other local problems collectively. Despite that levels of social organisation or 
disorganisation differ from society to society, they also change over time depending on how 
factors that force individuals to pursue criminal behaviours are manipulated. 
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Community social disorganisation is influenced by socio-economic and physical factors in 
and around communities. Sampson and Groves, (1989) argue that low economic status, 
ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility, and family disruption lead to community social 
disorganisation and as a result, community residents lose their ability to maintain informal 
social control. Residential mobility with a high influx of new-comers for example, acts as a 
barrier to the development of extensive friendship, kinship, trust, and collaboration (Sampson 
and Groves, 1989). Consequently, community residents work individually rather than 
collectively to deter and control criminal behaviour. A weak organisational structure within a 
community creates an environment that attracts criminal behaviour (Shaw and McKay, 1942 
cited in Steyn, de Beer, and Fouché, 2009) because there are no informal social controls. 
 
2.4 Conceptualising crime prevention 
Crime prevention is defined as “any public or privately based initiative or policy aimed at 
reducing or eliminating criminal behaviour, violence and fear of crime or violence in the 
community” (Crime Prevention Victoria (CPV), 2002, cited in Armstrong and Rutter, 2002). 
Crime prevention involves two approaches: firstly, the situational crime prevention approach 
focuses on criminal events and reducing crime rates by minimising opportunities for 
offenders; and secondly, the social crime prevention approach focuses on people and their 
dispositions towards criminal behaviour (Armstrong and Rutter, 2002).  
 
The situational crime prevention approach puts emphasis on community policing to establish 
working partnerships between the police and communities with the intention of reducing 
crime rates and enhancing security (Moore, 1992). Community policing can be reactive or 
proactive. Although Mbosowo (1995) postulates that reactive community policing is when 
the police make efforts to respond to people’s report of crimes whilst proactive community 
policing is a situation in which the police make efforts to detect and deal with crime on their 
initiatives, police work in collaboration with community. It is based on the assumption that 
by toughening legal sanctions and increasing risks and reducing rewards, offenders will 
refrain from committing crime. The situational crime prevention approach concentrates its 
efforts and resources on law enforcement.  
 
The social crime prevention approach enhances human capabilities by improving social 
conditions and by removing factors that force individuals into criminal activities (Mbosowo, 
1995). This approach focuses on addressing the root causes of criminality, and its impacts 
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may not be realised immediately. Yet, the approach is relatively effective in the long-term in 
the sense that the approach is implemented in such way that it provides alternative sources of 
income by tackling social issues that force individuals into criminal activities. The approach 
acknowledges that crime is a multi-dimensional problem in the society, thus it cannot be 
tackled by a single strategy and requires a comprehensive approach in which the efforts of 
individuals, public, private and societal agencies are integrated (Haskins, 2007). Haskins adds 
that it is important to fully understand the causes of criminal activities in the community if 
crime prevention is to be effective. Consistent with this suggestion, Tonry and Farrington 
(1995) point out that a sensible crime prevention policy should be differentiated according to 
different types and causes of crime.  
 
Crime problems are addressed through a comprehensive approach which take into 
consideration the whole environment around the community as Jeffrey (1971, cited in 
Mbosowo, 1995) postulates that crime can only be prevented if the environment in which 
crimes occur is manipulated accordingly. Manipulating the crime environment to reduce 
crime opportunities may include steps taken to improve a quality physical environment. 
Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) has emerged as a model for 
fighting crime. CPTED goes beyond crime prevention to address the link between crimes and 
place (Cozens, Saville, and Hillier, 2005; Landman and Liebermann, 2005). To stress the 
importance of improving environmental conditions in communities in which crimes occur, 
some people refer to CPTED approach as ‘place-based crime prevention’ (Cozens, Saville, 
and Hillier, 2005). The aim of CPTED is to reduce the root causes of crimes and 
opportunities for criminal events and address the fear of crime by applying comprehensive 
planning, design and management principles to the built environment (Landman and 
Liebermann, 2005).  
 
Improving infrastructure such as street lights is essentially important to ensure locations are 
rendered unsuitable for criminal activities but favourable for legitimate activities. By 
improving and maintaining the quality of physical environmental conditions, opportunities 
for criminals are reduced, and access control and surveillance by legitimate users are 
facilitated (Crowe, 2000 cited in Cozens, Saville, and Hillier, 2005). The improvement of the 
physical environment may involve different approaches: mechanical surveillance such as 
using street lights and Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV); formal or organised surveillance in 
which police patrols are involved; and informal or natural surveillance which is done by 
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community residents. Barr and Pease, (1992, cited in Cozens, Saville, and Hillier, 2005) point 
out that informal surveillance requires residents who are committed to participating in the 
control of crime while formal surveillance cannot effectively work without community 
participation.  
 
The assumption of CPTED approach is that crime prevention works effectively if 
surrounding environmental conditions are properly improved (City of Virginia Beach, 2000). 
This assumption indicates that CPTED is centred on three components which are: (i) situation 
crime prevention; (ii) social crime prevention; and (iii) improvement of physical 
environment. It takes into account three basic elements of crime. These elements are crime 
target, offender, and environment (Liebermann and Coulson, 2004). 
 
2.5 Community participation in the context of crime prevention  
The main aim of community participation is to increase the confidence and capacity of 
community members to participate in activities that improve their quality of life and build 
mutually supportive relationships that hold community members together (Skidmore, Bound, 
and Lownsbrough, 2006). Community participation in patrolling and maintaining local 
security and order is not a new phenomenon. The approach was adopted in the early days 
during the settlement of America when local volunteers were the first peace officers 
patrolling and controlling the streets. Community participation however, lost its use soon 
after the introduction of formal police in the mid-nineteenth century (Ren et al., 2006).  
 
Since the introduction of formal police, crime rates have significantly increased in 
neighbourhoods and communities due to ineffective policing and law enforcement because 
police were corrupt, abusive, and controlled by local politicians. They were relying more on 
new technology such as radios, 911 emergency telephone systems, and automobile patrols to 
responds to calls for help from citizens. Community involvement in crime prevention was 
neglected. Police were merely dealing with crimes and community problems were seen to be 
addressed by other agencies (Fleissner and Heinzelmann, 1996). During this era, the whole 
criminal justice system failed to address crime and its related consequences (Cozens, Saville, 
and Hillier, 2005). Consequently, the interaction and cooperation between communities and 
law enforcement officials became weak (Fleissner and Heinzelmann, 1996). 
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In the 1970s, governments started to address the ineffectiveness of the law enforcement 
approach by involving communities (Fleissner and Heinzelmann, 1996, Newham, 2005). It 
has been realised that crime could not be reduced in communities without involving local 
communities as actors in crime prevention policies. Given that the effectiveness of police 
operations depends mainly on local communities who have information about crimes, the 
inclusion of community members in crime prevention was very necessary. This 
acknowledgement of community participation in crime prevention seems to be the 
renaissance of the community policing model which had been abandoned after the 
introduction of formal police. Community participation in safety and security is now viewed 
as an effective strategy to crime reduction (Mbosowo, 1995; Newham, 2005) and is now 
gaining its popularity. 
 
Community participation model has a long standing history and has been extensively applied 
and investigated in other fields such as health, governance, education, development, and 
environment (Singer, 1995; Skidmore, Bound and Lownsbrough, 2006; Buccus, et al., 2007) 
but it was previously given little attention in crime prevention. Fighting and preventing crime 
was still seen as the work and responsibility of police and other law enforcement officials 
rather than being every community member’s responsibility. External forces such as the 
police could not fight crime effectively if residents were not incorporated since criminals live 
within the community members. Besides, community involvement in fighting crime would 
mobilise more human resources than could be done by government alone (Botterill and 
Fisher, 2002).  In addition, involving community residents in fighting crime enhances their 
capacity for resolving crime problems themselves.  
 
Community participation in the context of fighting crime is founded on the assumption that 
people know best the places in which they live and are able to solve local problems occurring 
in their neighbourhoods (Liebermann and Coulson, 2004). Community participation model 
also assumes that people share a common understanding and values to control and maintain 
collective interests in their community. Given that the community participation model aims to 
achieve a common interest, it is argued that the model is effective in well-organised 
communities. Referring to the social disorganisation theory, well-organised communities 
experience a high quality of social cohesion which facilitates participation (Sampson and 
Groves, 1989). Community social organisation may therefore, be regarded as a key 
component of community participation in preventing crime. Similarly, Carcach and Huntley 
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(2002) and Fagan and Meares (2008) add that people within organised communities are 
willing to participate in local activities including preventing and controlling criminal 
behaviours, and work as a team to achieve collective objectives. In organised communities, 
residents have common social values; trust each other (Sampson and Groves, 1989); and can 
fight crime as a team. Fighting crime is relatively difficult in disorganised societies because 
they experience weak social capital and are not living ubuntu. Both social capital and ubuntu 
are key components of community participation.   
 
2.5.1 Social capital and community participation  
Social capital reflects the ability of a group of people or community to achieve common 
benefits. Thus, social capital is referred to as a property of groups (Saegert and Winkel, 2004) 
but it requires group members to share the same actions, motivations, and expected outcomes. 
Social capital is centred on mutual trust, pattern of reciprocity, shared norms and identity 
(Flora et al., 1997, cited in Kassahun, 2010). Communities with higher social capital are more 
united and work as a team to solve their local problems including crime. In line with this 
argument, Bellair, (1997, cited in Carcach and Huntley, 2002) shows that communities with a 
strong, dense and high quality social capital have a greater capacity for fostering an 
environment to fight and deter criminal behaviours. 
 
Components of social capital such as mutual trust, communalism, reciprocity, and sharing 
social values enable residents to network and share crime-related information. With these 
components, community members are able to work as a team to achieve common objectives 
as Ostrom (2000) suggests that social capital provides an insight into how individuals deal 
with problems of collective action. Individuals in a community with low social capital face 
difficulties when solving problems including crime collectively. In his work, Putnam 
(2000:308) shows that crime rates are high in disorganised communities where there is low 
social capital.   
 
In relation to fighting crime, sharing crime-related information among community members 
reciprocally and freely is critical. The effective flow of information however, is possible if 
community members are well-networked between themselves and with external elements 
such as police who need information on crime that has occurred and on potential crime. This 
is more likely to happen in well-organised communities where residents are homogeneous 
and their mobility is limited. The implication is that social networks work effectively when 
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network members know each other very well and interact often to allow the flow of 
information freely (Saegert and Winkel, 2004). Examples of social network members could 
be family members, business associates, church members, school children, and sports club 
members. 
 
2.5.2 Ubuntu and community participation   
The concept of ubuntu is defined as humanness that envelops a spirit of caring community, 
harmony and hospitality, respect and responsiveness which individuals and groups display for 
one another (Mangaliso, 2001). Similar to this definition, Nussbaum (2003a; 2003c) 
describes ubuntu as the capacity in African culture to express compassion, reciprocity, 
dignity, harmony and humanity in the interests of building and maintaining community. 
Based on these features, it is argued that the concept of ubuntu is centered on values of 
interdependence, respect, sharing, interconnectivity, understanding, caring for each other, 
harmony, compassion, communalism, fraternity, loyalty, hospitality and trust. 
 
Literally, ubuntu is translated as collective brotherhood (personhood) and collective morality 
(Tshoose, 2009). The values of ubuntu show what it means to be a human being. As Ramose 
(2002, cited in Olinger, Britz and Oliver, 2007) states, human beings are recognized as being 
all equal, sharing a common basic brotherhood. Based on values of ubuntu such as 
communalism, sharing, and caring for each other, it is argued that people who live ubuntu are 
motivated and willing to participate in actions that intend to improve the quality of lives in 
their community.    
 
Communities that live ubuntu, experience a high level of social cohesion because residents 
share common values and are well-networked. As a result, they are able to control deviant 
behaviour and maintain social relationships. Given that ubuntu considers community as an 
essential element of personhood rather than self-determination (Nussbaum, 2003b), people 
are willing and prepared to act on behalf of others. Ubuntu promotes community participation 
because community members believe in solidarity, sharing, and equal opportunity. Based on 
these features of ubuntu, it is argued that communities that live ubuntu experience low crime 
rates because residents work collectively to control and maintain safety and order in their 
communities. Residents remain conformed to the shared social values and deviant behaviours 
are condemned. This means that individuals are discouraged from acquiring non-conforming 
behaviours 
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2.6 Conclusion  
Crime is socially, legally and historically constructed. From the social perspective, crime is 
constructed based on shared values by community members whilst crime is legally 
constructed based on the interest of law-makers. What is regarded as a crime in one 
community may be legitimised in other communities. Within one community however, crime 
may vary from time to time. Some activities may be criminalised in a particular period and be 
legitimised in another period. With cultural diversity and the interest of law-makers, it is very 
difficult to come up with a single definition of crime which is universally accepted.       
 
Crime rates are linked to the quality of a social organisation in a community. A high quality 
of social organisation is characterised by solidarity, communalism, hospitality and 
interdependency whilst a low quality of social organisation is characterised by individualism, 
independency, and selfishness. Communities with a high quality of social organisation 
experience low crime rates because community members are willing to participate and 
support crime prevention programmes. In contrast, communities with a poor quality of social 
organisation experience high crime rates because they cannot work collectively to fight 
crime. Besides, social capital and ubuntu which are key components of community 
participation are low in communities with a low quality of social organisation.  
 
Law enforcement with its sanctions plays a significant role in deterring criminal activities but 
it works effectively if communities are involved. As it is its purpose, law enforcement intends 
to reduce crime incidents without tackling causes of crime. This approach is useful to achieve 
short-term objectives but not long-term ones. Crime prevention involves a comprehensive 
approach which addresses concurrently three aspects: reducing crimes, removing causes of 
crime, and improving the physical environment. In addition, communities can supplement the 
work of law enforcement by exercising informal sanctions. 
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  Chapter 3  
Crime in South Africa: trends, costs and responses      
  
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides in-depth coverage of literature on crime and crime prevention in South 
Africa. South Africa experiences many socio-economic challenges including inequality, 
racism, poverty, and corruption but crime consistently features as the most urgent problem 
that devastates people’s lives (Nedcor, 1996 cited in Brown, 2001, Burger, 2007: 233). Many 
South Africans are exposed to high levels of crime with profound effects on people’s lives 
and economic growth. A twelve-month survey conducted from September 2002 to August 
2003 showed that almost a quarter (22.9) of all South Africans had been a crime victim 
(Burton, et al., 2004). While government officials claim that crime rates are decreasing, crime 
remains an everyday experience. In fact, no single day can pass without a major crime 
incident reported in the media. In 1994, the democratically elected government listed crime 
as one of the serious problems the country had to tackle urgently to improve safety and 
security for every South African (Demombynes and Özler, 2005) but the government is still 
far from achieving this goal. All crime prevention policies implemented by the government 
seem to lack proper direction.  
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: section 3.2 provides a brief crime situation in the 
country starting from the time of apartheid, using crime statistics. Section 3.3 discusses costs 
of crime to individuals, businesses, and to the government whilst section 3.4 discusses 
determinants of crime and violence in South Africa as well as factors that influence 
individuals to pursue criminal activities. Then section 3.5 provides insights into the criminal 
justice system in terms of crime prevention policies at national and local government levels, 
and section 3.6 provides conclusions based on issues that emerged from the chapter.   
 
3.2 A brief history of crime in South Africa 
The history of crime and violence in the country may be traced from the period of the 
struggle against apartheid (Shaw, 2002; de Wet, 2003; Møller, 2005) even though it has been 
argued that the crime situation became worse in the ‘new’ South Africa. During the apartheid 
regime, violence and crime rates were high but statistics on crime and violence are generally 
inaccessible. The available literature though shows that crime was increasing during the time 
of apartheid. The number of recorded murders for example, rose from 10,000 cases in 1989 to 
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11,000 cases in 1990. In the following year, the police reported 22,000 deaths through 
violence and crime-related incidents in only fifteen months.  And 16,067 cases of murder 
were reported alongside 78,677 robbery cases and 24,360 rape cases in 1992, the year South 
Africa was ranked one of the countries with the highest crime rate in the world (Winslow, 
2002 cited in Ikejiaku, 2009).  
 
The significant increase in crime during the apartheid era was noticed from 1980 to 1990, a 
decade in which activities of the anti-apartheid movement intensified (Shaw, 1997). When 
the country got freedom in 1994, many South Africans and the international community 
expected a considerable decline in crime rates but this did not happen (United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2002). The country is still ranked among countries with high 
crime rates in the world. Crime and its effects continue to devastate the lives of many people 
and affect businesses in the country. In 2000 for example, 2,300 crime cases were recorded 
for every 100,000 people living in South Africa in the period of five months (from January to 
May) compared to 2,187 in 1999 (Schönteich and Louw, 2001). Figure 1 shows that since 
April 2003 crime cases have gradually decreased from 2,666,427 to 2,168,254 crime cases in 
the year April 2010/March 2011 with an annual average of 71,167 cases.   
 
Figure 1: Total crime cases reported to police 
2 666 427
2 492 811
2 265 629 2 219 629 2 150 377 2 196 948 2 138 533 2 168 254
April  2003/
March 2004
April  2004/
March 2005
April  2005/
March 2006
April  2006/
March 2007
April  2007/
March 2008
April  2008/
March 2009
April  2009/
March 2010
April  2010/
March 2011
 
Source: SAPS (2011). Crime in the RSA (national total) for April to March   
  2003/2004 -2010/2011. 
 
The country experienced a significant decrease from April 2003 to March 2006 when crime 
declined by 15% in three years from 2,666, 427 to 2,265,629 crime cases. From April 2005 - 
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March 2011, the reported crime crimes reduced from 2,219,629 to 2,168,254 cases. This was 
a small decrease of approximately 2.3% in five years.     
 
3.3 Costs of crime  
Costs of crime vary from place to place depending on crime rates and types of crime. Places 
with high crime rates are likely to experience high crime costs compared to places with low 
crime rates. In this regard, it is argued that costs of crime in South Africa are high in the 
sense that the country experiences high crime rates. Costs of crime are incurred by 
individuals, group of people, businesses and even the government, each of which is discussed 
below.  
 
3.3.1 Costs of crime to individuals  
Costs of crime to individuals and households occur when a family member suffers from 
physical and mental harm due to a violent crime, or when individuals lose their properties. 
While trying to avoid potential crime costs, individuals or households incur other crime-
related costs such as expenditure on private security structures, electric fences and gates, 
alarms, neighbourhood watch to improve home security (Alda and Cuesta, 2010). However, 
costs of crime to households are difficult to measure but the costs in South Africa might be 
higher than people think. A recent study shows that the predominant crimes in the country 
that target individuals or households include home invasion robberies, burglaries, car 
hijackings, street muggings, smash and grabs, and organized attacks on retail shops (OSAC, 
2011). Similar to this argument, a study carried out in 2010 reveals that at least 25% of 
surveyed South Africans had something stolen from their homes in 2009 at several times, and 
21% of surveyed South Africans reported being physically attacked at least once in the year 
(Afrobarometer, 2010). In fact, everyone is a potential victim of crime, and many South 
Africans pay much costs of crime on protection.  
 
3.3.2 Costs of crime to businesses  
Crime also affects all sizes of businesses in South Africa from small to big, informal and 
formal businesses. The reputation that there are high rates of crime in South Africa affects 
foreign direct investments as investors see the country as not safe to invest (Stone, 2006). 
Similar to this claim, a study carried out among business owners shows that crime and fear of 
crime are rated as the major challenges which businesses face (RSA, 2008). In fact, armed 
robbery on business is one of the few increasing trends of crime throughout the country. 
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Criminals target restaurants, jewellery shops, grocery stores, cash in transit vehicles, 
shopping malls and centres (OSAC, 2011), and automated teller machines (ATM).  
 
Costs of crime to business organizations also include expenditure on private security and 
other measures taken by business organizations to improve security and safety around their 
properties. The private security industry is now seen as a booming business with potential 
profit. Interestingly, there are even people who argue that the number of people employed by 
the security industry is bigger than the number of people employed by the South African 
Police Service (Nedcor, 1996, cited in Brown, 2001; van der Spuy and Lever, 2010). 
 
3.3.3 Costs of crime to government  
The South African government spends a significant amount of its annual budget in 
administration of the criminal justice system and crime prevention programmes and projects. 
The government expenditure on crime has been increasing since 1994. Government 
expenditure on crime increased from R 12.047 billion in 1994/1995 to R 27.792 billion in 
2000/01 with a steady increase of 11% each year during this period (Blackmore, 2003). 
Different studies consistently show that the government expenditure on crime continues to 
significantly increase even though crime rates are falling. In 1980, the government allocated 
R 49 million to finance the criminal justice system but this amount increased to R 6.2 billion 
in 2006. This was an increase of 9.4 per cent annually (de Villiers and Nel, 2010). 
Furthermore, the comprehensive costs of crime were estimated to be worth US$ 22.1 billion 
(7.8% of the country’s GDP) in 2007 (Alda and Cuesta, 2010).1  
 
3.4 Causes of crime in South Africa  
Root causes of crime and other deviant behaviours in South Africa are contentious and have 
been linked to various factors and these include: the apartheid regime, socio-economic 
inequality, an ineffective and corrupt criminal justice system, weak informal social controls, 
and alcohol and drug abuse.  
 
Although South Africa experiences high crime rates, there are significant disparities of how 
the crime rates are geographically and racially distributed throughout the country. Crime and 
violence are concentrated in townships and rural areas which are dominantly occupied by 
                                                          
1 US$ 22.1 billion is approximately R 172 billion using exchange rate of R 7.80/US$ 
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black Africans. Victim surveys conducted from 1997 to 2000 revealed that people living in 
townships are more at risk of being crime and violence victims (Møller, 2005). A number of 
authors including Singh (2005) linked high crime rates in townships and in other black 
communities to the apartheid regime. The apartheid government has never showed the 
willingness to control and prevent crime in townships, rural areas, and other areas that were 
occupied by black people. Rather than controlling and preventing crime in townships, black 
Africans were only controlled by police to ensure there was no unrest against the apartheid 
government (Shaw, 2002).  
 
Protecting black Africans and their paraphernalia was not on the apartheid government’s 
agenda. The government was more interested in protecting the white population and its 
interests. The majority of police and resources were intensely allocated in the areas occupied 
by whites to ensure that crime and violence in townships were prevented from spreading to 
wealthy white areas (Shaw, 2002). Criminal activities were allowed to take root in areas 
occupied by black Africans. Consequently, crime and other deviant behaviours increased and 
normalised in these areas.  
 
In addition, the apartheid government marginalized black Africans socially and economically 
leading to socio-economic inequalities in the country and long term unemployment for black 
African people (Shaw, 2002). The black South Africans consist of more than three quarters of 
South Africa’s population but the majority of them live in severe poverty (Armstrong, 
Lekezwa and Siebrits, 2008).  As economists consistently link the distribution of welfare to 
crime (Brown, 2001; Demombynes and Özler, 2005), poverty and economic inequalities are 
also currently on the list of the most cited root causes of crime in South Africa (Palmary, 
2001; Demombynes and Özler, 2005; Nleya and Thompson, 2009). Based on economists’ 
assumption that individuals pursue criminal activities to maximize economic gains from 
those criminal activities, it is argued that poor individuals in South Africa commit crimes 
with the intention of getting economic returns such as money, food and equipment.  
 
Still on the causes of crime in South Africa, it is important to interrogate the ineffectiveness 
of the whole criminal justice system as a cause of high crime rates in the country. The law 
enforcement and other departments in the criminal justice system are very weak, slow and 
ineffective (Brown, 2001; Singh, 2005). There are even some allegations that the criminal 
justice system is corrupt (Shaw, 1996; Brown, 2001) and that it is administered by a wide 
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pool of unqualified staff (Schönteich, 1999). In the absence of legal sections, individuals tend 
to take law in their own hands and do whatever they want. Some elements in the South 
African society see this weakness in the criminal justice system as an opportunity to pursue 
criminal activities because they know the probability of being punished is very low.  
 
Even though the South African government considers formal sanctions as a central deterrent 
to crime and other deviant behaviours, there are some allegations that criminals are 
sometimes not arrested, or are released on bail without being prosecuted and many crime  
cases go undetected (Singh, 2005). In addition, many crime victims withdraw their cases 
before they go to trial because they have lost faith in the criminal justice system and due to 
delays in the criminal courts (Schönteich, 1999). These allegations indicate that the criminal 
justice system and its components are ineffective. As deterring crime and deviant behaviours 
is the purpose of implementing criminal law and the criminal justice system, all components 
of the criminal justice system including law enforcement has to be able to manipulate and 
influence the behaviour of potential criminals and deviants (Tonry and Farrington, 1995).    
 
Lack of parental guidance is another factor which contributes to high crime rates in South 
Africa (de Wet, 2003; Nleya and Thompson, 2009). Some parents are reluctant or too busy to 
guide and control children from pursuing criminal activities. In 1994 for example, 
approximately 40% of children in townships were left at home with no supervision during the 
day (Palmary and Moat, 2002). As a result of limited parental supervision, children get 
involved in crime and other non-conforming activities. In 1997, the number of young people 
who were in South African prisons was high and the number was increasing (Dissel, 1997). 
In 2002, 36% of all sentenced prisoners were young people, and 53% of all awaiting trial 
prisoners were young people under 26 years (Palmary and Moat, 2002). In some communities 
for example, youths have normalized illegitimate activities including crime and violence as a 
way of acquiring status (Pelser, 2008). However, children from dysfunctional families are 
more likely to commit crime. Dysfunctional families are those families experiencing a high 
level of family conflict, family violence, poor communication between parents and children, 
break-up, and child abuse (Muhammad, 2008).  
 
Different studies show that alcohol and drugs are among the root causes of crime in South 
Africa (de Wet, 2003; Newham, 2005; Nleya and Thompson, 2009). The contribution of 
drugs and alcohol to crime in South Africa is relatively high. A study conducted in 1997 
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showed that alcohol was linked to violence, particularly child abuse and rape (Shaw and 
Louw, 1997). In 2003, one study disclosed that 40% of crime case victims believed the 
assailant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the assault whilst one third 
of victims conceded to having been under the influence at the time of assault (Omar, 2004). 
Similarly, data of the Non-Natural Mortality Surveillance System (NNMSS) revealed that 
44.4% of 23,938 people who were fatally injured in 2004 were tested blood alcohol 
concentrations (South Africa Medical Research Centre (SAMRC) and University of South 
Africa (UNISA), 2004).  Crime statistics also show that crimes related to alcohol and drugs 
are high and continuously increasing (SAPS, 2011).   
 
3.5 Crime prevention policies in South Africa   
When the African National Congress (ANC) took over the control of government in 1994, 
one of its key promises was to fight crime so South Africans could be free from crime and 
violence. Some of the attempts by the government to fight and prevent crime include the 
implementation of different crime prevention policies at national and local government 
levels. The key national crime prevention policies are: the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme, the National Crime Prevention Strategy, the White Paper on Safety and Security, 
and the National Crime Combating Strategy. While local crime prevention approaches 
include community policing forums (CPFs) and their projects neighbourhood watches. 
 
3.5.1 The Reconstruction and Development Programme  
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was the first policy featuring crime 
prevention implemented in 1994 by the democratically elected government. The RDP was 
not designed to address crime directly, rather it was an integrated, coherent socio-economic 
policy framework intended to mobilize human and material resources which were needed to 
eliminate socio-economic inequalities as a legacy of apartheid (RSA, 1994; Corder, 1997). 
However, peace and security were among the six principles the RDP had to address. In this 
policy, the government vows not to tolerate illegitimate activities such as vandalism, 
lawlessness, drug trafficking, gun running, crime, and the abuse of women and children 
(RSA, 1994, Dixon, 2006). Besides, the RDP would indirectly reduce and prevent crime by 
addressing socio-economic inequalities as poverty is one of the factors that forces individuals 
into criminal activities for economic gains (Brown, 2001). 
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The RDP was centered on six basic principles namely: integration and sustainability, people 
driven, peace and security, nation building, meeting basic needs and building infrastructure, 
and democratisation. However, the implementations surprisingly gave little attention to safety 
and security issues. Much emphasis was on meeting basic needs such as land, clean water, 
housing, health facilities, education, and social welfare instead of restructuring the whole 
criminal justice system which was ineffective during the apartheid regime (Dixon, 2006). 
Without a doubt, meeting the basic needs is an essential strategy when fighting and 
preventing crime given that the strategy tackles factors that force individuals to pursue 
criminal activities. The problem of this social crime approach is that it does not address crime 
events rather potential crimes.  Considering how high crime rates were in 1994, the RDP 
would have focused on both situational crime prevention and social crime prevention 
approaches in lieu of focusing only on social crime prevention approach. It can be argued that 
the implementation of the RDP has been relatively unsuccessful.  
 
3.5.2 The National Crime Prevention Strategy  
Two years after the implementation of the RDP, the government realised that crime was still 
a pressing issue which the country had to tackle urgently. Thus, in May 1996, the government 
implemented another policy, the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) to improve 
safety and security (RSA, 1996; Dixon, 2006).  The NCPS was developed as a response to 
President Mandela’s address at the opening of Parliament in which he raised concerns about 
crime increase (Simpson and Rauch, 1999). Unlike the RDP which seemed to put its 
emphasis on social crime prevention, the NCPS focused on two approaches of crime 
prevention: reactive (situational) crime control to respond to the crimes already committed, 
and proactive (social) crime prevention as a way of preventing crime from happening (RSA, 
1996).  This strategy intended to address crime events and improve the well-being of South 
Africans through removing all factors and obstacles that could motivate and influence 
individuals to commit crime.      
 
The implementation of the NCPS showed that the government acknowledged the multi-
dimensionality of crime. The government developed a framework for the NCPS in such a 
way that it integrated all efforts and resources of the public, private institutions, individuals 
and communities to control and prevent crime. This framework was centered on four pillars: 
the first pillar is the criminal justice process which aims at enhancing the criminal justice 
system to deliver effectively and efficiently; the second pillar is reducing crime through 
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environmental design that will reduce the opportunities for crime and increase constraints; the 
third one is community values and education pillar that will encourage community 
participation in crime prevention; and the fourth pillar is trans-national crime programmes 
which was intended to control over cross borders traffic related to crime and improve 
regional cooperation to reduce international criminal syndicates (RSA, 1996; Rauch, 2002). 
With a closer look, the four pillars reflect the government’s intention of tackling crime with a 
holistic approach which would harden crime targets and remove causes of crime.  
 
On paper, the NCPS is arguably seen as a strategy that would notably tackle crime and its 
effects in South Africa. However, the NCPS failed to achieve its main objective of 
controlling and preventing crime. By the end of 1998, only two years after its 
implementation, crime was still seen as a threat to many South Africans and the international 
community. As pressure on the government increased, the government declared a war against 
criminals and it sent a warning message to criminals that the time for playing games is over. 
The implication of the message was that there would be no more tolerance for any kind of 
criminal activities. The message was followed by the enhancement of law enforcement and 
designing the infrastructure of the whole criminal justice system (Rauch, 2002).  
 
Still, the NCPS did not meet its intended goal of reducing crime due to a number of 
impediments. The intention of the government was to implement the NCPS at all government 
levels including national, provincial and local but the government did not elaborate how the 
strategy would be implemented at each level. Rather than coordinating the whole 
implementation of the NCPS, the government assumed that inter-departmental co-operation 
would be achievable and that all stakeholders would easily dedicate their resources, time and 
efforts to achieve common goals. In addition, government did not allocate a budget for the 
NCPS implementation but requested concerned departments to rationalize their existing 
resources to activities that were likely to reduce crime and to the NCPS programmes (Rauch, 
2001).  
 
Evidently, the collaboration between government departments was relatively challenging 
especially at provincial and local spheres where national departments such as criminal justice 
and defence are not represented (Simpson and Rauch, 1999). The NCPS was even staffed by 
people with limited crime prevention-related knowledge who were politically trusted by ANC 
government instead of being police officers (Rauch, 2001). The fact that there was no 
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coordination and guidelines put in place as to how the NCPS would be implemented, the 
dominant challenge in the NCPS implementation was the lack of focus and commitment to 
crime control and prevention in some departments. Heads of departments concentrated on 
restructuring and re-organizing their departments rather than responding to increasing crime 
rates (Rauch, 2001). However, the full commitment of all government departments to crime 
prevention was always going to be difficult because preventing crime is not a core activity in 
the majority of government departments such as health and education. If these departments 
had to commit themselves to crime prevention, their core activities would be compromised.     
 
3.5.3 The White Paper on Safety and Security  
In 1998, just two years after implementing the NCPS, the White Paper on Safety and Security 
was adopted as a core crime prevention strategy. In the meanwhile government was 
attempting to strengthen law enforcement and restructuring the whole criminal justice system. 
The intention of the White Paper was also to reduce and deter crime through enhancing 
police performance and supporting social crime prevention (RSA, 1998). Placing both 
situational crime prevention and social crime prevention approaches in the heart of the White 
Paper on Safety and Security was the evidence that the government fully understands the 
multidimensionality of crime and its causes. The government seeks to integrate all 
stakeholders at all levels so they can collectively fight crime. In fact, the government believes 
that if efforts and resources of individuals, government and civil society organizations are 
well co-ordinated would reduce crime rates in the country (Rauch, 2002).  
 
Although it may be argued that the White Paper on Safety and Security was implemented to 
compliment the NCPS, both strategies seem to be the same in terms of tackling crime. Both 
policies intended to address crime by adopting situational crime prevention and social crime 
prevention approaches. The implementation of the White Paper on Safety and Security 
followed the same direction of concentrating its resources on re-engineering the criminal 
justice system and law enforcement, but the addressing of root causes of crimes was given 
minimal attention. However, it is argued that reducing crime rates is urgent given that South 
Africa was experiencing high crime rates. To a great extent, the criminal justice system plays 
a significant role in deterring crime (Fagan and Meares, 2008) but crime prevention goes 
beyond the use of formal sanctions. Crime prevention addresses crime events while it is 
removing those factors which force individuals to commit crimes.   
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3.5.4 The National Crime Combating Strategy  
After other two years, the South African Police Service (SAPS) developed its own in-house 
national crime combating strategy (NCCS) as a response to crime which was still increasing 
(SAPS, 2002). In April 2000, the strategy was adopted with two major focuses: (i) to restore 
public confidence in the police and encourage community participation; and (ii) to reduce 
crime in particular areas though policing (Rauch, 2002). In fact, NCCS intended to stabilise 
crime and create a climate conducive to socio-economic development in approximately 140 
stations which were identified as ‘hotspot’ areas among 1200 station areas. These stations 
have been grouped into crime combating zones but these zones did not necessarily 
correspond with the boundaries of police stations. However, the crime combating zones 
included station areas adjacent to hotspot areas to prevent crime spilling over into 
neighbouring station areas (SAPS, 2002).  
 
The NCCS gave much attention to fighting dominant and serious crimes such as organized 
crime, proliferation of firearms, crime against women, and corruption (SAPS, 2002; du 
Plessis and Louw, 2005). Although fighting these crimes seems to require law enforcement, 
the NCCS took a step further to address root causes of the crimes as an acknowledgement 
that crime cannot be tackled with a single approach. Then, the NCCS adopted a 
comprehensive approach which urges different government departments to cooperate in the 
identified crime combating zones (SAPS, 2002).2 As South African crime prevention is based 
on principles of community policing (RSA, 2009), the NCCS calls for partnerships between 
police officials and communities. These partnerships, however, are not there to replace 
existing partnerships such as community police forums (CPFs) but to strengthen them (SAPS, 
2004).     
 
3.5.5 Crime prevention attempts at local government level  
At local government level, numerous attempts have been made to ensure that all people live 
in a safe environment. The South African government for example, strengthened community 
policing forums which had been in existence since 1993. The CPFs which are partnerships 
between communities and police facilitate police to mobilize and involve communities and 
other stakeholders (such as churches, community-based organisations (CBOs), and business 
                                                          
2 The government departments were: the SAPS, the Department of Safety and Security, Department of Justice, 
Department of Health, Department of Water Affairs, Department of Correctional Services, Department of 
Forestry, Department of Constitutional Development, and the South African National Defense Forces (SANDF).  
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organisations) in communities to participate in fighting and preventing crime. The 
community policing model focuses on ‘hot-spot’ areas (areas with high crime rates) and it 
operates in smaller geographical and manageable areas (RSA, 2009).   
 
After the failure of national crime prevention strategies, strengthening and increasing CPFs 
may be seen as a strategy with the potential of fighting crime in post-apartheid South Africa. 
The strategy is grounded on the visibility of police in the community, full community 
participation, and creation of ownership. Any crime prevention policy that excludes 
community involvement might be unsuccessful. The implementation of CPFs is based on the 
assumption that communities know their areas and are able to solve their local problems 
(Liebermann and Coulson, 2004). Although the implementation of CPFs requires well-trained 
and passionate officers, resources and active community members, CPFs are relatively 
fruitful since they work with local communities.      
  
In the same vein, community-based anti-crime programmes were already undergoing change 
in 1996, at the time that the NCPS was launched. The first and popular community based 
anti-crime programme is South African Safer Cities, which was funded by the UN Urban 
Management Programme in collaboration with the International Centre for the Prevention of 
Crime (ICPC). The programme ran in the three largest cities: Johannesburg, Cape Town, and 
Durban (Newham, 2005; van der Spuy and Lever, 2010). Many other community-based 
organisations were initiated to control and prevent crime in communities occupied by black 
Africans and other poor communities across the country. An example is the Community 
Peace Foundation that was introduced in the 1990s by prominent criminologist, Clifford 
Shearing after his return from exile. This initiative begun in Zwelethemba, a black township 
located in 120 km from Cape Town. It is now claimed the “Zwelethemba model” is being 
adopted in some poor Cape Town communities and even beyond (van der Spuy and Lever, 
2010).    
 
In contrast, rich neighbourhoods especially those are predominantly occupied by whites hire 
private commercial security companies to prevent crime. These companies are accredited 
with local police stations and are visible in neighbourhoods where they patrol streets and 
houses by cars or bicycles (van der Spuy and Lever, 2010). Private security guards are also 
visible at some shopping centres, business and public areas where they are hired by 
individuals or businesses. Interestingly, private security companies are even hired by some 
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government departments rather than using police who may cost nothing to the government 
besides their normal salaries.  
On one hand, the presence of private security guards in government organisations may be 
regarded as the government’s recognition that the private security industry contributes 
significantly to crime reduction. This recognition was acknowledged in 2007 by former 
President Mbeki in his crime prevention plan in which he called on the private security 
industry to cooperate with public police to respond to crime events (Potgieter, Ras and Neser, 
2008). On the other hand, it may be argued that the government uses private security guards 
because it does not have adequate police to control crime in all public places. Therefore, 
making police visible in all government organisations and public areas may require the 
government to recruit new police, and it may be more costly than hiring private security 
guards. The commercial security industry is now seen as a potential employer in South 
Africa.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
Crime and violence in South Africa are not a new phenomenon. The country was 
experiencing high crime rates even during the time of apartheid. Currently, crime rates in 
South Africa are still high regardless of the fact that the country is a democracy. Comparing 
the crime situation in apartheid South Africa and in ‘new’ South Africa, one can see that the 
difference is insignificant. Crime is still devastating the lives of many people, businesses, and 
economic growth in the country. Since 1994 after dismantling apartheid, the expenditure on 
crime prevention policies in ‘new’ South Africa has been consistently increasing and this 
expenditure is unlikely to decrease in the near future.    
 
However, South Africa seems to lack appropriate crime prevention policies to address crime 
problems effectively. All implemented crime prevention policies have failed to achieve their 
intended objectives. The government concentrates its efforts and resources on responding to 
the crime situation without addressing the root causes of crime. Crime prevention cannot be 
achieved with law enforcement only without tackling factors that force individuals to pursue 
criminal activities. To improve safety and security the South African government has to 
address both crime events and causes of crime. 
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Chapter 4 
Methodology   
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides insights into the methodology adopted in this study. It describes the 
research process and justifies research methods, and strategies deployed to attain the research 
objectives. The following is a brief outline of the way the chapter is structured. Section 4.2 
provides a brief description of the area in which the study was conducted. This description 
underlines socio-economic, demographic, and crime issues. Section 4.3 describes the research 
approach, and explains and justifies the research methods used in the study whilst Section 4.4 
describes the sampling approach used to choose informants and provides a justification of 
why those particular informants were preferred. Furthermore, this section also provides 
insights into tools and strategies adopted to collect both qualitative and quantitative data. 
Section 4.5 outlines how the collected data was analysed. Section 4.6 discusses the 
limitations of the study, while section 4.7 provides a synopsis of ethical considerations 
followed in the study.        
 
4.2 Description of site B   
The study was carried out in Site B which is one of the constituents of Khayelitsha. A 
detailed description of Khayelitsha is provided in section 1.5. Like other constituent parts of 
Khayelitsha, Site B is characterised by crowded and unplanned informal houses with limited 
access to water supplies, toilets, and lights. Most streets are small, unplanned and dirty with 
limited or no lights. In terms of crime, Site B as with the rest of Khayelitsha experiences high 
crime rates. In fact, the township was identified as one of the crime hotspot areas in the 
Western Cape. The existing literature and crime statistics indicate that Site B is among the 
areas with high crime rates in Khayelitsha (City of Cape Town, 2009).    
 
4.3 Research approach  
Given that qualitative study focuses on experiences, feelings, perceptions and attitudes of 
individuals in question (Ryan, Coughlan, and Cronin, 2007), the study employed this 
approach in exploring the interactions, perceptions and attitudes towards crime and the extent 
to which individuals experience crime and how they adapt to it. Similarly, when questions 
such as what, how, when, why, and where of a thing are to be answered, qualitative approach 
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is pertinent (Tewksbury, 2009). In the present study the researcher needed to identify crimes 
and locate them temporarily and spatially, and identify both victims and perpetrators. 
  
The quantitative method was deployed so the researcher could describe crime statistics to see, 
decipher trends and links between informants’ claims and factual data. The crime statistics 
were sourced from Khayelitsha police stations. 
 
According to Ryan, Coughlan, and Cronin (2007), techniques used to collect qualitative data 
include interviews, questionnaires, participant observation, written texts such as newspapers 
or diaries, and focus group discussions. In this study, the researcher preferred to use in-depth 
interviews which enabled him to probe and understand issues around crime. Different guiding 
questions were formulated for different informants. This means that there were questions for 
residents, questions for police, and questions for representatives of organisations. Although 
all questions for informants pertained to crime and crime prevention in Site B, questions 
varied from informant to informant depending on how and to what extent a particular 
informant was perceived to be involved in crime prevention. However, all questions were 
formulated based on the study objectives to ensure that the questions will yield information 
that will answer the research questions.   
 
4.4 Sampling procedures and interview process  
Key informants of the study were selected using the judgemental sampling method which 
allowed the researcher to freely choose informants based on their experience and perceived 
knowledge about crime in Khayelitsha. The researcher visited the study area twice before 
selecting informants to acquaint himself with the environment as he was still unfamiliar with 
Site B and cannot speak isiXhosa, a language spoken by the majority of Khayelitsha 
residents. The visits also helped the researcher to identify which anti-crime organisations to 
target as sources of information. The following organisations were identified: South African 
Police Service (SAPS) Khayelitsha Police Station, ward council, Khayelitsha Development 
Forum (KDF), Khayelitsha Safety and Security Forum (KSSF), Community Policing Forum, 
and South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO). Table 1 shows a list of key 
sources of data and includes the organisations listed above as well as the ward councillor and 
residents. Table 1 also shows the type of information solicited from each of the informants.  
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Data was collected over a period of three weeks starting on 08 – 29 October 2011 although 
some informants were contacted on the phone while analysing for further clarification on 
issues. Before going to the field for collecting data, the researcher drafted Table 1 below as a 
guide for data collection. Table 1shows sources of information, number of informants from 
each source, and types of information expected from each source.  
 
  Table 1: Sources of information to meet the objectives of the study 
Sources of information  
 
No. of 
informants 
Targeted information  
 
1. Anti-crime community 
based organisations    - Level of community participation in 
crime prevention programmes; 
- The extent to which residents are 
empowered to fight and prevent crime; 
- Strategies adopted by residents to 
prevent crime;  
- Challenges CBOs face;  
- Perceptions towards current crime 
situation; 
i. KDF 2 
ii. Street committee 
members 2 
iii. CPF 1 
iv. SANCO 1 
 
 
 
2. SAPS - Khayelitsha 
Police Station 
 
  
1 
 
 
- Level of cooperation between police and 
residents; 
-  Residents’ attitudes and perceptions 
towards police; 
- Strategies adopted by police to deter 
crime;  
3. Ward councillor 
 
 
1 
 
 
- Strategies adopted to prevent crimes; 
- Challenges in fighting crimes; 
- community participation in crime 
prevention;  
4. Ordinary residents 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
- Attitudes, perceptions and willingness to 
participate in crime prevention; 
- Strategies adopted by residents to fight 
crime;   
- The extent to which residents participate 
in crime prevention; 
- Challenges residents face  when fighting 
crime;    
- Perceptions towards current crime 
situation;  
- The cooperation between police and 
residents; and 
5. Crime statistics – 
Khayelitsha police station  
 
 
- Prevalence of crime and common 
crimes. 
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As the judgmental approach gives researchers  flexibility in deciding the type of information 
to be known and how to get the information (Bernard, 2002 cited in Tongco, 2007), the 
researcher interviewed representatives of anti-crime organisations while he was interviewing 
ordinary residents. No particular order of how informants or category of informants was 
followed when interviewing. The strategy was adopted so that issues that emerged in one 
interview could be probed in the following interviews.  
 
4.4.1 In-depth interviews with ordinary residents 
Initially, the researcher planned to interview 25 ordinary residents. This number was not 
fixed however, it could have decreased or increased depending on the type and quality of data 
from the initial interviews. This means that he was going to increase the number of 
informants until he obtained the information. The number of informants decreased to 13 
informants because the researcher started getting the same information after the 11th  
interview. The additional interviews therefore, were deemed unnecessary. Besides, there is no 
fixed or precise number of informants that should make up a purposive sample provided the 
needed information is obtained (Bernard, 2002, cited in Tongco, 2007). 
 
The informants were selected based on the perceptions that they have of relevant crime-
related information. The sample was stratified in terms of age and sex to avoid systematic 
biases when collecting information. In this regard, four youths and nine adults of whom four 
were women while five were men. This strategy enabled the researcher to get pertinent and 
relevant information from different categories of informants who experience crime 
differently.  
 
It was difficult to access informants because many houses were closed or adult households 
were not available, and many of those who were available often refused to participate in the 
study.  Consequently, the researcher found himself walking long distances in informal 
settlements looking for informants. The researcher found this very challenging since 
Khayelitsha is one of Cape Town’s crime ‘hotspot’ areas. To mitigate the lack of local 
knowledge, the researcher hired a Khayelitsha resident who is familiar with the environment 
and could speak IsiXhosa. The person’s main duty was not limited to guiding the researcher 
but he also worked as a translator whenever necessary. The researcher also tried to resemble 
local residents in terms of dressing to disguise himself so to avoid being seen as an outsider, 
otherwise he would become a crime target. 
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4.4.2 In-depth interviews with representatives of community and local organisations 
In this study, eight representatives of community and organisations involved in crime 
prevention programmes were also interviewed. These interviewees included: a police officer 
of Khayelitsha Police Station, a Communication Officer, the Councillor of ward 90, two 
street committee members, the secretary of the Community Policing Form (CPF), the 
Chairperson of Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF), the Chairperson of South African 
National Civic Organisation (SANCO), and the Deputy Secretary of the Safety and Security 
Forum. Unlike ordinary residents, these representatives were more accessible and 
collaborative except the councillor of ward 92 who refused to participate in the study.  
 
In each case, the researcher called the respondents over the phone to set up an appointment 
and discuss a suitable venue for interviews. Five of these interviews were conducted at 
Khayelitsha Police Station due to its accessibility in terms of transport and safety. These 
include interviews with the police, Ward Councillor, Deputy Secretary of Khayelitsha Safety 
and Security Forum (KSSF), and chairperson of KDF, Chairperson of SANCO. Interviews 
with street committee members were conducted in their houses while the interview with the 
secretary of CPF was conducted at Khayelitsha Magistrate court.      
 
4.4.3 Crime cases reported to Khayelitsha police station  
The researcher initially planned to use statistics of crime cases reported to Khayelitsha Police 
Station in the three preceding years as secondary data. Regrettably, Khayelitsha Police 
Station refused to avail these statistics to the researcher. The researcher was able though to 
source seven-year crime statistics of Khayelitsha Police Station from the SAPS web site. 
 
 4.5 Data analysis  
In qualitative research, the number and type of informants involved in the research may not 
matter much in determining the quality of data but in how data are analysed. Indeed, the type 
and level of data analysis determines the credibility of findings (Ryan, Coughlan, and Cronin, 
2007). The data analysis process of the current study was as follows:  
 
The researcher transcribed individuals’ interviews into word-for-word transcripts which were 
printed out to allow him to read them and easily understand and identify impressive points in 
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the texts. The researcher reviewed the research questions which were to be answered in the 
data analysis. Then each question was linked to every individual’s response to identify 
consistencies and differences. After bringing all the data of each question together, the 
researcher identified categories and themes and labelled them. And patterns and connections 
within and between categories were identified because such connections were important to 
understand and explain effects, and the relationship within and between themes. The 
researcher interpreted data to provide meanings which may be understood by readers.       
 
4.9 Ethical considerations 
During the course of the interviews, ethical principles were taken into consideration and 
adhered to. Interviewees were fully informed what the research was about, the principle of 
informed consent was followed throughout the study. In addition, participants were not 
forced, bribed or persuaded to participate in the study. The participation was voluntary and 
each participant could withdraw from the research at any stage of the interview.   
 
4.10 Conclusion 
The study was carried out the environment in which the researcher could not move freely due 
to high crime rates and language barrier. The results of the study therefore, might have 
affected due to the inaccessibility of some potential informants could provide rich 
information although the researcher was moving around with one of the community members 
who speaks the local language (IsiXhosa).  
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Chapter 5 
Mapping crime in Site B, Khayelitsha    
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes crime and trends and identifies the predominant crimes. The chapter 
also discusses the perceived causes of crimes in Site B, Khayelitsha, a township which was 
described as ‘no-go’ area due to high rates of crime and violence during the time of apartheid 
(Nemasetoni and Rogerson, 2007). Given that the main objective of this study is to 
investigate the role of community members in fighting and deterring crime, providing an in-
depth description of the current crime situation provides the context within which crime 
prevention initiatives occur. The chapter is structured as follows: section 5.2 is concerned 
with analysis of crime and perceptions of residents towards the prevalence of crime. Section 
5.3 discusses predominant crimes based on informants’ perceptions and crime statistics while 
section 5.4 provides insights into perceived root causes of crime. 
       
5.2 Crime trends in Site B, Khayelitsha     
One of the most significant findings of this study is how the interviewed residents see crime 
as a part and parcel of Khayelitsha residents’ daily lives, normalized, and which residents 
cannot do much about.  One street committee member stated that: 
 
Crimes are being committed all times but many crimes are committed during 
the night…. We always hear women screaming when their handbags are grabbed 
  in the morning when they are going to take a train going to work or when 
they are coming from work in the evening (Street committee B, on 8 October 2011).  
 
Along the same sentiments, another informant commented favouring Khayelitsha during the 
time of apartheid regime than in the democratic era. The informant admitted that apartheid 
oppressed people but people were living in a safe environment (Informant D, on 8 October 
2011). Given the level of brutality suffered by Africans under apartheid rule, this statement is 
quite revealing that the crime situation in Site B is high and people are frustrated with the 
crime situation.  
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Contrarily, the reported crime statistics over the past seven years from April 2004 to March 
2011 in Figure 2 show a declining number of crime incidents from 9139 cases in the year 
April 2004/March 2005 to 5265 crime cases in the year April 2010/March 2011. This is a 
decline of 42.4% in seven years although the bulk of the decline of 32.8% occurred in the 
year April 2005/March 2006 when the total number of crimes reported at Khayelitsha Police 
Station in April 2004/March 2005 declined from 9139 to 6235 crimes in April 2005/March 
2006. However, from the year April 2005/March 2006 until last March 2011, crime incidents 
declined only by 15.56%, from 6235 to 5265 cases. This contradiction between informants’ 
perceptions towards the crime situation and crime statistics is not a surprise given that the 
crime situation is measured based on crime statistics without taking into account community 
perceptions (Faull, 2010).   
 
Figure 2: Recorded crime cases at Khayelitsha Police station 
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Source: SAPS (2011). Crime in Khayelitsha (WC) for April to March 2003/2004 - 
2010/2011 
  
Although it is not clear what caused this decrease, it may be suggested that increased efforts 
by government in terms of increases in budget for fighting and preventing crime (Alda and 
Cuesta, 2010) have played an important role in this. On the other hand, it is possible that 
residents have become discouraged to report crime at the Khayelitsha Police Station as 
revealed by some informants that they do see the need for reporting a crime to police since 
the police do not make any follow up when a crime is reported.  
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Even though these crime statistics do not indicate the time in which crimes took place in 
terms of months, weeks in a month, or days within a week, the street committee’s narrative 
above suggests that most crimes in Site B are committed during the night and early morning 
(Street committee B, on 8 October 2011). Criminals take advantage of the cover of darkness 
in the early morning and evening as this offers them the opportunity to pursue criminal 
activities. This is the time when committing crime is regarded as less risky and more 
attractive to potential criminals who want to minimize their probability of being arrested.  
The rational choice theory hypothesizes that individuals commit a crime after balancing costs 
and benefits attached to a particular crime to determine whether such crime will generate high 
returns (Slocum, 1959; Brown, 2001, Mann and Mante, 2004). It is therefore, argued that 
individuals in Site B commit crimes after calculating the probability of being caught. If the 
probability of being caught is high, then criminals may opt either not to commit crime or to 
take the risk and commit crime. When the probability of being caught is slim, then criminals 
are more likely to commit crime unless there are other factors that may put off criminals’ 
intentions of committing crime.  
        
5.3 Predominant crimes 
While qualitative data from all informants indicates robberies and theft, drug abuse, assaults, 
rape, house and shop breakings, and child kidnappings are the key crimes; more detailed 
crime statistics in Figure 3 show that theft and robbery-related crimes dominate all reported 
crimes at Khayelitsha Police Station each year for seven years. Assault crimes are the second 
most common crime consisting of one fifth of all reported crimes each year for seven years 
whilst from April 2007 to March 2011 alcohol and drug-related crimes, and malicious 
damage to property occupy third and fourth place of the most common crimes respectively.  
 
The crime statistics show that from the year April 2004/March 2005 to April 2010/March 
2011 crimes in all categories generally decreased except in the alcohol and drug-related 
category which showed a consistent increase from April 2006/March 2007. This increase in 
crime related to drugs and alcohol however, has still not been explained although it may be 
argued that the number of drug users is increasing as affirmed by all informants. A number of 
informants posit that most drug users are teenagers and young adults of whom many are still 
school learners. One informant said that some learners take Methamphetamine commonly 
known as ‘tik’ and other drugs even while they are still at school (Street committee B, on 08 
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October 2011). Methamphetamine was identified among the most common primary 
substances of abuse in the Western Cape (Pluddemann, et al., 2010). 
      
Figure 3: Predominant reported crime cases at Khayelitsha police station 
 
Source: SAPS (2011). Crime in Khayelitsha (WC) for April to March 2003/2004 - 
2010/2011 
 
All informants argue that crime rates are relatively higher in informal settlements such as TR, 
PSJ, and BM sections compared with areas with formal houses. Literature also shows that 
high crime rates are linked to a poor quality of physical environment (City of Virginia Beach, 
2000; Cozens, Saville, and Hillier, 2005; Landman and Liebermann, 2005). Areas with 
informal settlements have poor infrastructure which attracts individuals to commit crime and 
remain untraced. These areas are characterised with crowded informal houses which are 
unnumbered, with limited or no streets and street lights. Potential criminals take advantage of 
this poor and limited infrastructure to pursue criminal activities since they know it is difficult 
to be traced when they commit crime. 
 
 5.4 Perceived causes of crimes   
This section discusses factors that influence individuals in Site B to pursue criminal activities 
based on informants’ perceptions. These factors include: poverty, drugs and alcohol, lack of 
parental guidance, ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system, and bad social models.   
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5.4.1 Socio-economic inequalities  
Income distribution in South Africa has been consistently linked to crime claiming that 
economic inequality is one of the factors that forces individuals to pursue criminal activities 
(Brown, 2001, Palmary, 2001; Nleya and Thompson, 2009). This study shows that Site B is 
not exceptional as all informants perceived poverty as the major root cause of crime claiming 
that many crimes are committed by individuals who are unemployed and seek money for 
food. One informant referred to most crimes that take place in Site B and in other parts of 
Khayelitsha as ‘crimes of needs’ (the Deputy Secretary of KSSF, Boqwana, 12 October 
2011). Boqwana argued that the majority of Khayelitsha residents especially youths are poor 
and not working to earn an income. Literature also shows that more than half (65%) of 
Khayelitsha residents are young people who are likely to be economically inactive (City of 
Cape Town, 2006). Therefore, they see committing crime as an ultimatum source of income 
for them. In relation to this argument, crime statistics show that the majority of the crimes 
reported to Khayelitsha Police Station are related to theft and robbery (see Figure 3).  
  
5.4.2 Alcohol and drug abuse 
The use of alcohol and drugs was perceived by all informants as the second factor which 
influences individuals to commit crimes in Site B after poverty although crime statistics 
indicate that crime committed under the influence of alcohol and drugs occupied the third 
place from April 2007 until last year March 2011 (see Figure 3). However, the statistics are 
consistent with the informants’ claims that the number of alcohol and drug-related crimes as 
well as the number of drug users is increasing. The informants stated that most drug users are 
youths including teenagers. 
 
Most crimes related to alcohol and drugs are committed during the week-ends from Fridays 
to Sundays because many people spend large parts of their week-ends in shebeens drinking. 
There are even some people who spend their week-ends in shebeens even if they do not have 
money as it was revealed by one informant that:  
 
During the week-end, people in townships want to enjoy themselves. It is the time for 
people especially young girls and men to show off. Even if they do not have money 
they dress up nicely and hang around shebeens and other public places such as 
shopping malls, and markets (Informant G, 8 October 2011).    
 
 
 
 
 
 43 
In the interview at Khayelitsha Police Station, another informant emphasized that many 
crimes are committed during the week-ends when people are drunk. The informant said:  
 
If you want to confirm what I say, just come to this station on Saturday or Sunday in 
the morning and see how many people who come to report that they have been 
victimised. There are even those who spend a night here because they are arrested 
when they are drunk or crime suspects (Informant H, 26 October 2011).    
 
The narrative above is not surprising as it is consistent with a study carried out in 2007 in 
South Africa which found that more than 50% of raped people were high or drunk at the time 
of the incidents (Holtmann, 2008). Based on the narrative and literature, it is argued that in 
Site B when individuals are drunk they become crime targets.    
 
 Crimes are committed by individuals who would be looking for money to buy drugs and 
alcohol. According to Captain Van der Vyver, individuals commit crime as long as they have 
no money for drugs and have no other source of income. They rob people and when the 
money is spent, they go to look for other potential crime victims to rob. Captain Van der 
Vyver referred to this situation as a cycle: committing crime to get money for drugs/alcohol 
over and over again (Captain Van der Vyver, 12 October 2011). In addition, alcohol and 
drugs also influence users to commit crimes other than stealing such as assaults, rapes, and 
violence. These are among those crimes which may be committed when drug users are out of 
control due to drugs/alcohol consumption.  
 
5.4.3 Lack of parental guidance     
In every community, parents and other community members have to take responsibility in 
guiding and preventing children from committing crime and pursuing other non-conforming 
activities. While all informants claimed that most crimes in Site B are committed by 
teenagers and young adults, a number of informants blamed parents for their minimal role in 
guiding and controlling their children. According to these informants, many parents do not 
make an effort to monitor their children’s behaviour. Some parents do not show concern 
about where their children spend the day and what they are doing. Surprisingly, there are 
parents who support and protect their children even when they commit crimes or fail to 
conform to shared values (Street Committee member B, 8 October 2011). This informant 
claimed that when these parents are told that their children got involved in criminal activities, 
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they become aggressive and defensive. It is not clear why parents support and defend their 
children when they are wrong but Street Committee member B believed that parents benefit 
from criminals committed by their children.         
   
In some instances, parents have little time for their children as they spend most of their time 
at work and leave children alone at home. Thus, parents may not be aware of all the activities 
their children are involved in. Other parents spend most of their time in shebeens drinking 
rather than taking care of their children as pointed out by Captain Van der Vyver (Captain 
Van der Vyver, 12 October 2011). Captain Van der Vyver gave an example where children 
go missing and parents report the incident about six or eight hours later because the parents 
were not around or were drunk during the incident. In relation to this, one study reveals that 
almost half of the children in townships are left alone at home during the day (Palmary and 
Moat, 2002)     
 
From the parents’ point of view, children are regarded as uncontrollable. An informant who is 
a parent claimed that nowadays children are no longer listening and respecting their parents 
(Informant A, 14 October 2011). The informant blamed the protection given to children by 
the law saying that: children are protected by law……the current South African laws 
discourage parents from disciplining their children. In this regard, Captain Van der Vyver 
did not reject the idea of parents sanctioning children informally but the problem is when 
sanctions given to children are excessive and harsh. If a child is assaulted by their parent for 
example, the parent may face charges irrespective of whether the children were wrong or 
right in the first place. Captain Van der Vyver added that police cannot do anything else 
except to enforce the law as it is (Captain Van der Vyver, 12 October 2011).  
 
With the protection mentioned in the paragraph above, some children now feel they have the 
freedom and right to behave and do what they feel is good for themselves as expressed by 
one interviewed young man:  
Parents cannot control children anymore because of democracy. You cannot ask 
children to do something they do not want to do and you cannot force them to do it as 
they would say that you are violating their human rights (Informant F, 18 October 
2011).  
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However, this protection does not apply to children only but to all people in South Africa as 
the rights of every person were enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the South African 
Constitution. In the interviews, almost every informant appreciated the protection given by 
the constitution but the informants do not support the protection of criminals. It is to this end 
that a large proportion of informants blamed the government for protecting criminals. One 
informant compared this protection of offenders as a way of promoting the criminality in the 
country. The government has to allow residents to sanction their children and other criminal 
suspects since the criminal justice system is ineffective and corrupt (Street Committee 
member A, 15 October 2011).   
 
5.4.4 Ineffective and inefficient criminal justice system 
Almost every informant complained about poor service delivery of the SAPS and its failure 
to respond immediately to crime reports when they are called to intervene. One informant 
said that police are called for help when a person is in danger but the police give excuses that 
they have no vehicles around or that there are no police to come to the crime scene. A person 
has to wait and the police come 25 or 30 minutes late when criminals have already left 
(Informant K, 12 October 2011). This shortage of resources in the SAPS was acknowledged 
by one street committee member and the Secretary of CPF, Nomawethu Mosuna who said 
that police stations in Khayelitsha do not have enough police to patrol all the crime ‘hotspot’ 
areas (Street Committee A, 15 October 2011; the Secretary of CPF, Nomawethu Mosuna, 18 
October 2011). These allegations however, are not surprising as other studies showed that the 
SAPS is ineffective and corrupt (Show, 1996; Brown, 2001; Singh, 2005).  
 
Corruption in the SAPS was also the informants’ concern. A number of informants alleged 
that that some police are corrupt or get involved in criminal activities. Although the 
informants could not provide evidence to support and prove their allegations, corruption in 
the SAPS is not a new allegation (Singh, 2005; Faull, 2011). In this study however, the 
allegations are based on numerous incidents where police in Site B deliberately release 
criminal suspects without charges against them. Captain Van der Vyver commented that: 
…allegations should not be regarded as a final conclusion until they are supported with 
evidence. She did not rule out the allegations that some police get involved in criminal 
activities including corruption. To avoid ungrounded claims, Captain Van der Vyver 
requested community members to provide evidence so that those bad police can be removed. 
Arguably, corruption or releasing offenders without charges is likely to cause a crime 
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increase given that offenders are not deterred from committing crime. To minimise the 
number of offenders, it is essential to exercise sanctions because some individuals may be 
discouraged to commit crime through fear of punishment if they are caught (Fagan and 
Tracey, 2008).   
 
5.4.5 Bad social models 
Social role models play an important part in transmitting and modifying behaviour (Bandura, 
1969) in a community where crimes and other deviant behaviour are dominant. Individuals 
may acquire new behaviour by imitating or learning others’ behaviour (Krohn et al., 1985). 
Data of this study indicates that people young people in particular become criminals when 
they interact with criminals who are regarded as their social models.  One young adult, who 
was a first year student at the University of the Western Cape at the time of the interview, 
confessed that he became a gangster when he started interacting with peers who were 
gangsters (Informant G, 8 October 2011). After some time, he stopped robbing people when 
he joined a local youth organisation where he became inspired to go to university. From this 
confession, it could be noted that the exposure to high criminality and that the interaction 
with criminals can influence individuals to acquire criminal behaviour.  
 
5.4.6 Market of stolen goods 
Among all the above mentioned factors that influence crime rates in Site B, the demand of 
stolen goods was given minimal attention by all informants except one informant who made a 
point that crime would be reduced if residents stop buying stolen goods. The implication here 
is that people steal goods so that they can sell them to get cash. This however, is not 
surprising considering that most committed crimes are theft-related (see Figure 3). Selling 
stolen goods could be a way of generating income for some individuals as the Secretary of 
CPF, Nomawethu Mosuna mentioned that there are some individuals who pay money to 
young people and other vulnerable people so they can steal for them (the Secretary of CPF, 
Nomawethu Mosuna, 18 October 2011). The market for stolen goods and equipment such as 
guns and knives to use in committing crime contribute to high crime rates. The stolen goods 
however, are not necessarily sold or supplied only in Site B. Sometimes stolen goods in Site 
B are sold in other areas of Khayelitsha such as Harare, Site C or Macassar even in other 
townships such as Mfuleni, Nyanga or Philippi where thieves are unlikely to be caught. 
Similarly, goods stolen in those areas may be sold in Site B.  
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5.5 Conclusion  
While crime statistics from Khayelitsha Police Station show that crime is declining, 
perceptions of interviewed ordinary residents indicate that there is no positive change in the 
crime situation. If the crime situation is measured by the number of reported crime cases 
without taking into account community perceptions and community satisfaction, the crime 
situation in Site B is improving. But if these elements: crime statistics, community 
perceptions and community satisfaction are considered, there is a lot to be done to fight crime 
in Site B. Crime statistics are not sufficient to measure the crime situation. Views of 
community members should not be undermined when measuring the crime situation in a 
community.      
 
Informants’ perceptions and crime statistics indicate that poverty is perceived to be the major 
cause of crimes committed in Site B. The majority of people said they have no other means of 
income to sustain themselves and their families. As a result, they see committing crime as a 
source of income such as money and gadgets that can be sold easily. All crimes including 
theft and robbery-related crimes show a decline except crimes committed under the influence 
of drug and alcohol which are constantly increasing. This increase suggests that the number 
of people who use drugs and alcohol is increasing. Under the influence of drugs and alcohol, 
individuals commit crimes or become crime victims.  
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Chapter 6 
The contribution of community in crime prevention in Site B 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides insights into how Site B residents participate in controlling and 
maintaining safety and security in the area. Ekblom and Pease (1995, cited in English, 
Cummings, and Straton, 2002) proposed three approaches of community crime prevention: 
action for the community, action through the community, and action with the community. 
Consistent with these approaches and the main objective of this study which is to investigate 
the role of community in crime prevention as stated in chapter one, the focus of this chapter is 
on the action of local residents as actors in crime prevention rather than the action of external 
organisations and institutions for the community. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows: section 6.2 looks at the extent to which residents in Site 
B work contribute to CPF by patrolling streets as volunteers. Section 6.3 provides insight into 
how residents assist police to fight and prevent criminal activities. The section also discusses 
residents’ attitudes, perceptions and willingness to participate in crime prevention. Sections 
6.4 and 6.5 enlighten on the contribution of residents in SANCO and Khayelitsha Security 
and Safety Forum respectively whilst section 6.6 provides an analysis of the extent to which 
the residents take their own initiatives to fight and prevent crime by exercising informal 
social sanctions, and the extent to which the residents fight crime through CBOs such as KDF 
and SANCO 
 
6.2 Patrolling streets as a strategy of crime prevention     
This section provides an analysis of how the residents work in the Community Policing 
Forum (CPF) as unpaid volunteers to fight and deter crime and other non-conforming 
activities. The Community Policing Forum is a formal institution composed of ordinary and 
unarmed civilians who are elected by community members to represent them in controlling 
and maintaining security and safety in their areas. The main purpose of forming CPFs is to 
mobilise and involve residents in fighting crime in collaboration with community police. The 
formation of CPFs is in accordance with the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 
which provides for police stations to work closely with communities through community 
policing forums (RSA, 1995; Mistry, 1996).  
 
 
 
 
 
 49 
6.2.1 The role of the residents in CPF 
The CPF mobilises residents to participate in crime control in a specific area through small 
projects which are referred to as neighbourhood watches. Each neighbourhood watch 
operates in a designated area which is manageable and controllable. Civilians from the same 
neighbourhoods come together voluntarily in order to control crime and other deviant 
behaviours in their areas in collaboration with the police. In the whole of Khayelitsha, there 
are three neighbourhood watches which operate with the three police stations available in 
Khayelitsha. This means that each neighbourhood watch operates under a specific police 
station. Neighbourhood watch in Site B works with Khayelitsha Police Station and it has 60 
volunteers who patrol streets. Although there is no specific period for which residents have to 
volunteer in the CPF as street patrollers, the CPF Executive Committee members are elected 
in the office to volunteer for a period of three years (the Secretary of CPF, Nomawethu 
Mosuna, 18 October 2011).  
 
Volunteers patrol streets only during the night in collaboration with police. According to 
Captain Van der Vyver, volunteers may not work in the absence of police because they are 
unarmed civilians and may sometimes encounter criminals who are equipped with firearms 
and may potentially be attacked (Captain Van der Vyver, 12 October 2011). Working without 
armed police cover therefore, would potentially put volunteers in danger. This suggests that 
the work of volunteers depends on the availability of police, and requires close collaboration 
between neighbourhood watches and police for them to coordinate their efforts. 
  
Communication between neighbourhood watches and police however, seems to be a one-way 
rather than a two-way communication. Captain Van der Vyver stated that when 
neighbourhood watch members are available for patrol, they have to liaise with the 
commander of the police station in advance so he/she can arrange police whom they can 
work with. If neighbourhood watch members do not communicate with the police station 
commander in advance, then police will be allocated to other areas where they may be needed 
(Captain Van der Vyver, 12 October 2011). This indicates that the police station commander 
does not liaise with volunteers to enquire about their availability. The possible impact of this 
one-way communication is that neighbourhood watch members may feel neglected and 
unimportant in the neighbourhood watch project. Thus, volunteers may lose interest and 
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commitment to the project. On the other hand, one-way communication may reflect police’s 
failure to engage and create a strong bond with communities.           
 
The neighbourhood watches schedule to patrol the streets only three days a week, from 
Friday until Sunday. The secretary of CPF, Nomawethu Mosuna pointed out that the shortage 
of manpower in neighbourhood watches during week days is the reason why patrols occur 
during the week-ends. As a result, they concentrate their efforts and resources on week-ends, 
the period when criminal activities peak (the Secretary of CPF, Nomawethu Mosuna, 18 
October 2011). However, there are some instances in which neighbourhood watch members 
or police are not available to patrol. In the interview, Captain van der Vyver acknowledged 
that there are times that police are not available to work with neighbourhood watches. For 
example, police officers have to be allocated to areas which need emergency intervention 
(Captain Van der Vyver, 12 October 2011).   
 
6.2.2 Residents’ attitudes, perceptions and willingness to patrol streets   
Involving the community in programmes such as crime prevention enhances the capacity of 
participants to address future problems on their own rather than relying on external elements 
(Botterill and Fisher, 2002). While all informants indicated that they consider the work of the 
neighbourhood watch as an essential element of curbing crime incidents, younger informants 
were less supportive of neighbourhood watch. Two interviewed young men admitted that 
they preferred not to be involved in patrolling streets because they had friends who commit 
crimes. Another study also shows that most crimes in South Africa are committed by 
teenagers and young adults (Schönteich and Louw, 2001). These interviewees also revealed 
that they are more interested in paid work so that they can improve their socio-economic 
situation.    
 
Previous studies have showed that youths who get involved in criminal activities are those 
children from disrupted families where there is lack of informal social control over their 
activities (Sampson and groves, 1989; Weijters, Scheepers and Gerris, 2009). The data of this 
study also reveals that teenagers and young adults raised in families of one parent are more 
likely to become criminals. According to the Secretary of CPF, Nomawethu Musona, 
children with single parents are involved in criminal activities due to two factors: (i) Poverty 
– most single parent families struggle to put food on the table and provide other basic needs 
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for their children. Thus, their children get involved in criminal activities so they may get what 
they do not get from their families; and (ii) Lack of time – some single parents do not have 
enough time to control their children. The parents sometimes go to work leaving their 
children behind with nobody to look after them. Therefore, the parents may not be aware of 
what activities their children get involved in unless there is a person who reports them (the 
Secretary of CPF, Nomawethu Mosuna, 18 October 2011).  
 
Among those informants who are appreciative of the work of neighbourhood watches 
however, some respondents showed less interest and willingness to voluntarily participate in 
patrolling streets. In this regard, the informants mentioned two factors that hinder their 
willingness and interest in joining neighbourhood watches. The first reason is the allegation 
of ineffective policing by the SAPS in Site B. With the police in South Africa are allegedly 
corrupt and ineffective (Singh, 2005; Faull, 2011), all informants claimed that working with 
police to patrol streets as unhelpful and unfruitful. One informant who used to be one of the 
neighbourhood watch members claimed that volunteers sometimes catch criminal suspects 
but police release them with no charges. The informant stopped patrolling when police 
released a crime suspect who had been caught on patrol during the night with goods which 
were assumed to be stolen. He narrated:  
 
One night around 02h00 we were on duty patrolling then we saw a person crossing 
from Mfuleni section coming to Khayelitsha. We stopped the suspect, he tried to run 
away but we caught him. He had a DVD player and cell phone. The suspect was 
locked in the police’s vehicle and then we continued to patrol. In the morning around 
05h00 a.m., the police let the suspect go with the DVD player and cell phone without 
any charge against him. The police never even asked the suspect to prove whether the 
DVD player and cell phone belonged to him. They just let him go freely (Informant 
H, 26 October 2011). 
 
All informants cited poverty as another major factor that hinders residents’ participation in 
crime prevention activities. The informants indicated that they would not volunteer while 
their families are starving. In fact, informant A stated that he cannot volunteer to fight crime 
when police are employed and paid every month-end for the work (Informant A, 14 October 
2011). The implication here is that the residents would join neighbourhood watch only if they 
expect to receive some economic benefits in the form of money, goods or other valuable 
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material. Relating to this argument, the secretary of CPF, Nomawethu Mosuna also 
acknowledged that some residents are poor and they need stipends to motivate them to get 
involved in controlling crimes and other non-confirming behaviours (the Secretary of CPF, 
Nomawethu Mosuna, 18 October 2011). Given that the majority of the residents of 
Khayelitsha live in poverty (Thompson and Conradie, 2010), it would be difficult to get many 
people to voluntarily participate in crime prevention. One may argue that residents who 
participate in crime prevention in site B are those residents who do not experience economic 
challenges.  
 
Property ownership plays an important role in individuals’ willingness to participate in 
fighting and preventing crime. Residents with little or no property are reluctant to join 
patrolling groups because they have nothing to protect as shown by informant B who pointed 
out that he sees no need to control streets because he has nothing to lose. His argument was 
that patrolling streets serves the purpose of protecting a few wealthy individuals (Informant 
B, 8 October 2011).  The raised issue here is about individuals volunteering to patrol streets 
while they have little or no property to protect. Residents with little or no property may feel 
they have no stake in patrolling streets, thus they may not be willing to participate whilst 
residents with property are willing to participate in patrolling streets so they can protect their 
property. When individuals do not have property and are not willing to participate in 
patrolling streets, stipends may be used as a strategy to motivate them to participate.  
 
Yet, Street Committee member A stated that his area struggles to get patrollers because of the 
high number of households headed by women or children (Street committee member A, 15 
October 2011). Arguably, women and children may get involved in crime prevention in other 
ways such as providing information about potential crimes but not patrolling streets due to 
their vulnerability. The street committee member added that he would not even ask them for 
some money to pay people who may patrol on their behalf as more affluent communities pay 
money to private security companies to patrol their areas (van der Spuy and Lever, 2010).  
 
6.3 Residents as police’s informants  
This section enlightens the contribution of Site B residents in the police’s work of fighting 
and preventing crime. According to section 205 of the South African Constitution, the South 
African Police Service (SAPS) is the constitutional body primarily delegated with the 
responsibility to prevent, combat and investigate crime; to maintain public order; to protect 
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and secure the inhabitants of South Africa and their property; and to uphold and enforce the 
law. To achieve these goals, the SAPS implements five programmes: administration, visible 
policing, detective services, crime intelligence, and protection and security services. 
Although these programmes need and support each other, the visible policing programme is 
designed for fighting and preventing crime (SAPS, 2011). The main aim of visible policing is 
to make police more visible in local communities and make them more familiar with local 
residents. The programme also enables police to be more proactive and reactive to crime 
(Fleissner and Heinzelmann, 1996) and other deviant behaviour that take place in the 
community.  
 
Additionally, the policing model allows police to focus on small geographical areas which are 
further divided into smaller and more manageable sectors (RSA, 2009) so that police are able 
to strengthen their partnership with local residents. Consistent with this literature, 
Khayelitsha Police Station divided its area into six sectors which are patrolled by 50 police. 
According to one informant, Captain Van der Vyver of Khayelitsha Police Station, each 
sector is allocated a certain number of police who regularly patrol it (Captain Van der Vyver, 
12 October 2011). This means that each sector is patrolled by the same police so they become 
familiar with residents to enhance the degree of trust and cooperation between police and 
residents. Cooperation and trust are essential components for service delivery in the police. 
When people become passive, it will be difficult for the police to access the information 
needed to solve crime problems (Fleissner and Heinzelmann, 1996).    
 
6.3.1 The contribution of residents to police’s work           
The role of the local community in complementing the police in relation to fighting crime is 
still unclear among many local residents. Fighting crime is viewed as the exclusive domain of 
the police in particular and other components of the criminal justice system. The work of the 
police would be difficult without the support of local residents who possess better knowledge 
about their locality and are best placed to provide information about crime events or potential 
crimes (Fleissner and Heinzelmann, 1996). Similar to this literature, this study found that 
keeping police updated with crime-related information is the major contribution which 
residents can provide in preventing crime given that they are normal civilians with no guns as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter. Captain Van der Vyver intimated residents to work with 
police by providing information about crime incidents and potential crimes Captain Van der 
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Vyver, 12 October 2011). Providing information about crime is a key component of a 
strategy that will enable police to be more proactive and reactive to crime.  
 
At times, there are some residents who are unwilling to share crime-related information with 
police. Sometimes these individuals witness crime incidents or have information about 
potential crime but they prefer to keep quiet rather than reporting them to police (Captain 
Van der Vyver, 12 October 2011). This claim was echoed by all informants who admitted 
that they sometimes do not report crime events due to fear of being victimised by criminal 
suspects. Specifically, informant J said that people are willing to report crime events that take 
place in their community but they are afraid that criminal suspects may come back to 
victimise accusers or witnesses in revenge (Informant J, 26 October 2011). Even if they see a 
crime happening, they do not report or condemn suspects, rather they keep quiet and pretend 
as if nothing is going on. One young male said that if he sees a person being robbed he just 
continues with his work or he stands aside watching the event but he cannot do anything 
(Informant C, 8 October 2011).  
 
Similarly, withholding information has negative impacts on justice due to the fact that people 
are often unwilling to testify in courts as witnesses. Courts cannot therefore convict criminal 
suspects without enough evidence. Surprisingly, residents accuse police and the criminal 
justice system for being ineffective and corrupt when criminal suspects are released without 
being convicted.   
 
To encourage residents to provide crime-related information, police promise anonymity to 
whoever provides information. However, it is argued that there are some situations where this 
strategy is not practical. In the court for example, a person who reported the crime may be 
required to be a witness if she/he has the evidence. On the other hand, the strategy may help 
police to conduct its investigation of a particular crime. Again, keeping the informant’s 
identity confidential can assist police to prevent crimes as police have access to information 
they would otherwise not have. Another measure taken by Khayelitsha Police Station to 
promote reporting crimes and sharing information on crime is to protect people who provide 
information. The Witness Protection Programme is one example of the measures in place 
implemented by the police station to protect whistle blowers and their families if they feel 
threatened.                         
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Another reason why residents do not inform police about criminal activities is the lack of 
confidence in the police. The South African Police Service is perceived to be corrupt and 
ineffective (Shaw, 1996; Brown, 2001; Faull, 2011) and thus no longer commands trust from 
many citizens. In Site B, many people consider reporting criminal suspects to police as a 
waste of time. All interviewed residents said that they know and witnessed many incidents 
where crimes were reported but the police make no attempt to follow up. A similar claim was 
made by street committee member B who bitterly narrated an incident of how he reported to 
police a suspect who broke into his house:  
 
People broke into my house when I was not around and after a few days one person 
whom I know was seen selling some of my belongings. I was informed by the people 
who saw him but when I reported this to the police, they never bothered themselves 
carrying out an investigation except to tell me that there is no evidence (Street 
Committee member B, 8 October 2011).  
 
Incidents like this may discourage people from reporting crime to police. People may feel 
disappointed when they report crime events and police take no action.  
 
However, Nomawethu Mosuna argued that if a person reports a crime to police and the 
person does not open a case, the police often do not bother carrying out investigation on the 
reported crime (the Secretary of the CPF, Nomawethu Mosuna, 18 October 2011). This 
argument may imply that a person who reports a crime event has to open a case so police can 
make a follow up. Again, this may result in a decrease of the number of people who report 
crimes to police especially when whistleblowers: are not crime victims; have no interest in 
reporting crime or in providing information on potential crimes; and when it is risky for 
whistleblowers to open a case.   
 
Some informants linked this reluctance of police to corruption and ineffectiveness of the 
SAPS. Interestingly, Captain Van der Vyver admitted that suspects are sometimes released 
without charges although she complained about people who tarnish the image of police by 
alleging that police are corrupt arguing that people who make those allegations have little 
knowledge of the operations of the criminal justice system. Suspects are released without 
charges only when there is not enough supporting evidence to gain a conviction.  Captain 
Van der Vyver said that there are people who assume that the police’s work is to arrest 
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criminal suspects, take them to court and ask the court what to do (Captain Van der Vyver, 12 
October 2011). The work of police is to arrest a crime suspect; the investigator gets all 
relevant information, does all the necessary paper work and puts them in a docket. When the 
docket goes to court, the case is no longer in the police’s hands and the police cannot 
influence the decision of the court. If the suspect is released, it is the court’s decision rather 
than the police. Police arrest criminal suspects and find evidence but they do not get involved 
in convicting the suspects.   
 
The fact that visible police rely on information from local residents to carry out its duties 
effectively, the cooperation between police and community is arguably crucial. The data of 
this study indicate that the cooperation between visible police and local residents is relatively 
weak in the sense that some residents are not interested in sharing information on crime with 
police. In fact, there are some residents who still regard the police as the enemy rather than 
people who can protect them as revealed by Captain Van der Vyver (Captain Van der Vyver, 
12 October 2011).  
  
Such unfavourable attitudes towards the police were also noted in some interviews with 
residents who referred to some police to as helpless people with no dedication to their work. 
Street committee member A classified police officers into two categories based on how 
committed they are to their work: there are those police officers who enjoy being in the police 
service and are dedicated to their jobs; and there are those officers who are in the police 
service simply for money and they lack dedication and a sense of duty (Street Committee 
member A, 15 October 2011). In this context, the street committee member and one resident 
argued that the government recruits unsuitable and unqualified people into the police service 
to create jobs. This argument is consistent with Schönteich’s (1999) claim that the criminal 
justice system has a high number of unqualified and inexperienced staff.       
 
6.3.2 Residents’ attitudes and perceptions towards working with police  
As the visible policing approach intends to ensure that police are seen often in the 
communities where they patrol (Fleissner and Heinzelmann, 1996; SAPS, 2011), all 
informants admitted that they see police patrolling streets of Site B by vehicles during the day 
and night although some informants have criticised the effectiveness of visible police. The 
visible police are allegedly ineffective in terms of being proactive and reactive to crimes. 
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Street Committee member B regards the work of visible police as a way of wasting 
government resources:  
 
The police use state resources with no apparent reason. They move from street to 
street in a vehicle but you will not see them arresting anyone. I get upset when I see 
the police moving with no criminals locked up in the vehicle when I know criminals 
are all over (Street Committee member B, 8 October 2011).  
 
Similar lamentations also emanated from interviews with residents who complain that police 
sometimes see a group of skollies sitting on the streets or moving around but police pass them 
without questioning or searching them.3 However, one may argue that the police may not 
search or arrest people without evidence and information that the suspects have the intention 
of committing crime. Police need information from local residents since they live amongst 
the suspects.  On the other hand, regular patrolling may have two further positive impacts: 
firstly, patrolling enables the police to respond to crime events on time in the sense that 
police will be moving around and in the community. Secondly, patrolling prevents crime 
from happening as potential offenders may refrain from committing crime due to fear of 
being caught. The visibility of police therefore, increases the risk of committing crime.  
 
6.4 The role of residents in the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) 
This section discusses the contribution of Site B residents to fighting crime in collaboration 
with their street representatives known as street committees. These street committees are 
elected by residents to represent and advocate on behalf of their street members. As one street 
committee member mentioned in the interview, street committees are affiliated to the 
SANCO. In fact, they are the lowest SANCO structure and work closely with citizens (Street 
Committee member A, 15 October 2011). The SANCO is a civil movement which has 
committed itself to improving the well-being of all South Africans by promoting unity, 
equality, democracy and freedom by tackling issues such as security, housing, water, 
electricity, and other problems that affect residents on a regular basis (SANCO, 2001).  
 
                                                          
3 Skollies is a Cape Town Afrikaans word which means criminals or people of bad behaviour.   
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In the interview with one street committee member, he said that residents report crime 
incidents and provide information about potential crime to their respective street committees 
so measures can be taken. If a crime is reported for example, the street committee members 
approach the crime suspect, crime victim and few residents and sit together to find a way of 
sanctioning the crime suspect or addressing the problem in an amicable manner without 
involving police or other external elements such as courts (Street Committee A, 15 October 
2011). One advantage of handling crime problems at street committee level is to resume and 
maintain the broken relationship between two parties in conflict and to promote 
neighbourliness.  
 
However, some interviewed residents see informing or reporting criminal suspects to street 
committees as helpless given that street committees are not much recognised by their 
members as people who have a stake in fighting crime. Street committee members are 
regarded as simple as normal residents with minimal authority and power to influence or take 
any action. This was confirmed by a scenario given by Street Committee member B which 
shows that street committee members are also crime targets like other ordinary residents and 
they have limited power to sanction criminal suspects. In the scenario, Street Committee 
member B said that his shack was robbed while he was away. One of his neighbours showed 
him the person who was suspected of robbing his shack but he could not take action against 
the suspect except report him to the police (Street Committee member B, 08 October 2011). 
Surprisingly, some of the informants especially youths mentioned that they do not even know 
who their street representatives are. Consequently, some residents opt to take law into their 
own hands by punishing criminal suspects.  
 
6.5 The contribution of residents to the Khayelitsha Safety and Security Forum 
Khayelitsha Safety and Security Forum (KSSF) is a division of Khayelitsha Development 
Forum (KDF) which aims at improving safety and security in Khayelitsha. KDF as a whole is 
a civil society initiative founded in 1992 to foster development in Khayelitsha. It is the voice 
of the Khayelitsha residents which lobbies and advocates on behalf of  residents for their 
improved well-being by tackling issues affecting residents including housing, water, 
electricity, and security among others (the Deputy Secretary of KSSF, Boqwana, 12 October 
2011). This approach of lobbying and advocating makes Khayelitsha residents at large 
relatively passive in term of involvement in crime prevention.  
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Few residents who are elected by residents as KSSF representatives work on behalf of others 
as Boqwana stated that KSSF does not run any project which addresses crime issues directly 
in which residents can get involved. With little or no influence on their operations, KSSF 
only engages with and coordinates all anti-crime initiatives from government departments 
and civil society operating in Khayelitsha including Site B to ensure there is an integration 
and synergy to achieve a collective goal. However, it identifies areas where there are outcries 
in terms of crime and it takes initiatives and engages with all organisations dealing with 
crime prevention by organising an event at which residents come and speak out about their 
concerns (the Deputy Secretary of KSSF, Boqwana, 12 October 2011). This implies that 
residents in Site B other than KSSF representatives contribute to crime prevention by 
providing information and views only when KSSF invited them to meetings to address crime-
related issues.   
 
Inviting residents to crime-related meetings to speak out about their concerns is a strategy for 
accommodating the views of a large number of residents all at once but the challenge to this 
approach in Site B is that some residents lost interest in attending the meetings. One of the 
reasons advanced by some informants is the unproductiveness of the meetings as stated by 
one resident:  I am fed up with attending their meetings which talk about the same things over 
and over with no outcome. They keep talking about ‘skollies’ every time and they do nothing 
to them (Julia, 29 October 2011). This narrative indicates that some have frustrations with the 
high crime prevalence in Site B while nothing much is done to prevent crime as discussed 
previously in section 5.2.  
 
Besides some interviewed residents who said that they do not know about KSSF and its 
representatives in Site B, others do not perceive KSSF as an anti-crime organisation because 
it does not run its own anti-crime projects as mentioned in the section above. These 
informants revealed that they never have been approached by any KSSF representative asking 
them to participate in fighting crime by either patrolling streets or providing crime-related 
information. The informants stated that they report or inform the police or street committees 
rather than KSSF representatives.   
 
6.6 Informal social controls as a form of crime policing   
This section provides an analysis of the extent to which the residents take initiatives to fight 
and deter offenders from committing crimes as police by applying informal social controls. 
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The main focus in this section is on how informal social controls are exercised, and 
challenges residents face when exercising informal social controls. Informal social controls 
play a substantial part in deterring deviant behaviours and preventing criminal activities. 
Fagan and Meares (2008) postulate that informal social controls are effective by inhibiting 
problem behaviours, facilitating conformity, and restraining social deviance once it appears 
in a community.  
 
6.6.1 Individualism: a root cause of ineffective informal social controls   
The contribution of informal social controls in Site B seems to be minimal. Residents are 
reluctant to exercise informal punishment and other sanctions such as condemnation and 
isolation. For example, all informants blamed parents for not being responsible in terms of 
providing parental guidance. Informant D argued that parents and community members are 
no longer controlling children or other offenders as it used to be in the early 1970s or as it is 
in the rural areas of Eastern Cape (Informant D, 8 October 2011).4 The main point the 
informant was making is that sanctioning offenders in Site B was supposed to be everyone’s 
responsibility irrespective of whether they know offenders or is related to offenders.  
 
Individuals in Site B community commit crimes or show the intention of committing crimes 
yet residents take no action in either reporting criminals to the police or sanctioning 
offenders. Everyone works individually as was expressed by one of the informants who 
remarked that …life in this township is about minding your own business (Informant C, 8 
October 2011). The traditional values of communalism, fraternity, and collectiveness which 
are core features of social capital and ubuntu have been sacrificed in pursuit of individualism 
in Site B. The community lacks the rubric with which to sanction offenders and hold 
offenders accountable. Informal social controls flourish in the communities with little 
individualism, strong primary relationships, and where extended family retains primary 
authority (Anleu, 1998). Similarly, a community keeps crime rates low if its members share 
common values and are willing to work on behalf of others (Sampson and Groves, 1989; 
Brown, 2001). In the same vein, one prominent informant acknowledged the lack of 
communalism in Khayelitsha. He commented that: ….in a divided community, criminals take 
                                                          
4 The majority of Khayelitsha residents migrated from Eastern Cape where they were born and raised. 
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advantages (the Deputy Secretary of KSSF, Boqwana, 12 October 2011).5 Hence, Boqwana 
called all stakeholders to concentrate their efforts and resources so that they can fight crime 
collectively.     
 
Informant D stated that people tend to care for only their close family members, relatives and 
friends (Informant D, 8 October 2011). If a person has no close relatives or friends, no-one 
cares for him/her. The informant exemplifies that if a person is attacked by robbers; people 
pass or stand aside and watch the incident rather than assisting the victim. This individualism 
in Site B does not reflect social capital and ubuntu which inculcate unconditional care for 
everyone. In a community that lives according to the dictates of ubuntu assisting or rescuing a 
person from danger does not necessarily require the need to know the person as ubuntu is 
centered on brotherhood, hospitality, and reciprocity (Nussbaum, 2003b). Both social capital 
and ubuntu are key features of organised communities and they promote solidarity in 
controlling and preventing crime. 
 
6.6.2 Informal sanctions versus formal sanctions  
Informal social controls deter crime and other deviant behaviours effectively if they are 
paired with formal controls (Fagan and Meares, 2008; Jiang and Lambert, 2009). However, 
data of this study shows that informal social controls conflict with formal sanctions rather 
than supporting and supplementing each other. Some informal sanctions such as corporal 
punishment is challenged and it is sometimes criminalised by law. As it was previously 
mentioned earlier in section 5.4.3, a number of informants blame the South African laws for 
discouraging residents to discipline offenders informally. The informants argued that the laws 
are too soft and protect criminals instead of punishing them. This makes some parents feel 
that their role as parents is undermined. One parent expressed his disappointment saying that 
parents are no longer sanctioning their children because they may be accused for abusing 
their children while they were disciplining them (Informant H, 26 October 2011).  
 
Even though legal sanctions cannot work effectively when they are supported by informal 
sanctions (Fagan and Meares, 2008) Captain Van der Vyver insisted that allowing and 
encouraging people to exercise informal sanctions would endanger individuals’ lives as 
                                                          
5 Mr Boqwana holds also a senior position in government as Senior Communication Officer in the Department 
of Government Communication and Information System in the Western Cape Province. 
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residents are likely to take law into their own hands by punishing criminals with crime. She 
revealed that traditional courts referred to as ‘buntu courts’ in Khayelitsha were banned 
because their judgment is based on informal justice. In many cases criminal suspects are 
convicted without enough evidence. Captain Van der Vyver added that most sanctions 
offered by ‘buntu courts’ are corporal punishments and exceed the crime allegedly 
committed. Criminal suspects are sometimes killed if police do not intervene (Captain Van 
der Vyver, 12 October 2011). The judges of these courts are normally community elders with 
little knowledge about laws and the legal system. Their judgment therefore, might be based 
on their personal feelings and views rather than law.    
 
From a different perspective, it may be argued that ‘buntu courts’ and vigilantism would play 
a crucial role in reducing and preventing crime in the sense that the South African criminal 
system is allegedly ineffective (Singh, 2005; Faull, 2011). In line with this argument, some 
respondents affirmed that there are incidents where residents have to punish criminal suspects 
before the police’s arrival otherwise the police would protect the suspects. In fact, the 
respondents blamed police and laws for protecting and favouring criminals instead of 
punishing them. One informant described South African prisons to as hotels claiming that 
criminals eat nice food and get the opportunity to make money while they are in prisons 
(Informant D, 8 October 2011).  
 
Besides the ‘buntu courts’, vigilantes are also accused of taking law in their own hands. 
Vigilantes are groups of few community members who are self-appointed to protect their 
areas against criminal activities including robbery and theft. This vigilante approach, known 
also as ‘street justice’ applies ‘mob law’ (Cape Argus, 27 March 2012) and it metes out 
ruthless punishments. Killing criminal suspects using the ‘necklace’ (a burning tyre around 
the crime suspect’s neck) is the most popular punishment used in vigilantism as echoed by a 
number of informants. One informant emphasized that burning criminal suspects alive or 
killing them using other methods is the ultimate way of fighting crime in the community 
since the criminal justice system including the SAPS failed to do their work. In the whole of 
Khayelitsha, at least three criminal suspects are being ‘necklaced’, killed using another 
method, or sjambokked, chased away from his family or the community every month 
(Informant F, 18 October 2011). Figure 4 shows three criminal suspects who were about to be 
necklaced in a vigilante killing in Khayelitsha. 
 
 
 
 
 
 63 
Figure 4: Three criminal suspects waiting to be necklaced in Khayelitsha 
 
 
Source: Cape Argus (2012). Vigilante attacks - summit on mob law. 27 March 2012 
 
6.7 Conclusion  
All the interviewed residents of Site B appreciate the work of CPF of fighting crime by 
patrolling the streets but most of them are not willing to get involved in patrolling the streets 
as volunteers. Poverty is perceived as the major factor that hinders the residents’ participation 
in patrolling the streets. The interviewed residents indicated that they are not willing to do 
voluntary work while they struggle to put food on the table for their families. Besides, police 
are employed to do the work and they get paid for that every month. Although members of 
CPFs are to render their services voluntarily with no compensation (Mistry, 1996), residents 
of Site B need stipends to motivate them to patrol their areas in numbers because people 
cannot volunteer while they are hungry.    
 
Interviews with residents also indicate that cooperation between police and residents is 
relatively weak. Police fail to engage properly with local residents who are pivotal players in 
the programme in terms of updating police by providing information on crime incidents and 
potential crimes. Some residents are not willing to help police fight crime. The residents do 
not share crime-related information with police claiming that police are ineffective and 
corrupt. Reporting and providing crime-information to police is regarded as a waste of time 
because police take no action.  As a result, residents opted to take the law into their own 
hands through vigilantism. Criminal suspects are sometimes sanctioned informally by 
residents without involving the criminal justice system.      
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Despite this vigilantism, informal social controls in Site B seem to be too weak to deter 
crimes and other deviant behaviours. Some residents are reluctant to prevent offenders from 
committing crime. There are incidents in which residents do not react to crimes committed in 
their presence. A number of informants also blamed parents for failing to condemn or punish 
their children when they commit crime although interviewed parents defended themselves 
saying that punishing children and other offenders informally is sometimes criminalised by 
South African law. If the use of informal sanctions is discouraged crime will likely to 
continue to prevail in Site B because the criminal justice system is ineffective.        
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides a review of the findings and underlines key issues that have emerged, 
as well as areas of concerns. The chapter is structured into different themes based on the 
objectives of the study to unpack the contribution of the study and demonstrate how research 
questions were answered. The main objective of this study is to investigate the level of 
community involvement and empowerment in Site B, Khayelitsha in fighting crime. Other 
objectives are: (i) identify common crimes in Khayelitsha and assess their prevalence; (ii) 
assess residents’ attitudes, perceptions and willingness to get involved in improving safety 
and security in their area; (iii) explore strategies adopted by residents to prevent crime and 
identify key challenges; and (iv) describe the level and form of cooperation between local 
residents and police.  
 
7.2 The crime situation and dominant crimes    
The crime situation in Site B is worrying many residents although there is a contradiction in 
the findings of this study where crime statistics show that crime has been consistently 
declining in the past seven years while a number of informants perceived that crime is high.  
The informants claimed that they have not experienced any decline in crime because crimes 
are being committed on a daily basis. There was even an informant who argued that 
Khayelitsha was safer during the apartheid regime than during the democratic era. Although 
informants’ perceptions about crime are not quantifiable, they should be taken into account 
when assessing the crime situation in the community to avoid the contradiction between 
crime statistics, and residents’ perceptions and satisfaction.  
 
Most crimes are committed in the early morning and evening when it is dark. Criminals take 
advantage of the darkness to minimise costs tied to crimes if they are caught as the rational 
choice theory hypothesized that individuals commit crimes after balancing costs and benefits 
from committing a particular crime (Brown, 2001). Both crime statistics and qualitative data 
from informants indicated that predominant crimes in Site B are theft and robbery, drug and 
alcohol abuse, assaults, and rapes. However, crime statistics showed that almost half of all 
reported crime cases to Khayelitsha police station each year for a period of seven years from 
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April 2004 to March 2011 were those crimes related to theft and robbery, followed by 
assaults, then crimes related to drugs and alcohol.  
 
7.3 Perceived causes of crime  
Poverty is regarded as the major cause of crime in Site B. A large proportion of informants 
mentioned that most crimes are committed by individuals who would be seeking food, money 
and other valuable goods that can be sold quickly and easily. Poor individuals use crime as a 
strategy of generating income. This is consistent with the occupational choice theory which 
links crime to income distribution (Brown, 2001; Demombynes and Özler, 2005). However, 
it is not always poverty that incites individuals in Site B to rob or steal people because there 
are some individuals who rob or steal people to get money for drugs and alcohol as argued by 
some informants including Captain Van der Vyver. 
 
 All informants see the use of drugs and alcohol as another factor that contributes to the high 
crime rates in Site B. Many individuals, particularly teenagers and young men, commit 
crimes or become crime victims while they are under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. 
Although all informants affirmed that the use of drugs is increasing in the community, the 
number of reported crimes related to drugs and alcohol is very low compared to other crimes 
such as theft and robbery-related crimes and assault crimes. Yes, crime statistics show that 
the number of crimes related to drug and alcohol is gradually increasing but the number is 
low and does not reflect concerns that crimes related to drugs and alcohol are prevalent. 
Probably, there are some crimes committed while under the influence of alcohol and drugs 
which are not reported to the police or they are reported but recorded under other categories 
such as sexual crimes, assault crimes, murder, and damage to property.   
 
Data of this study indicates that crime rates are high in informal settlement areas where 
infrastructure is poor. As hinted by some informants, offenders are attracted to criminal 
activities by poor infrastructure in informal settlements because they know it is very difficult 
to trace them due to the fact that these areas have informal houses which are crowded, few 
streets and lights are limited. Other factors that were identified as major contributors to high 
crime rates in Site B include the ineffectiveness of both formal and informal sanctions. These 
factors play a big role in alluring individuals to pursue criminal activities. All interviewed 
ordinary residents alleged that the police are ineffective and corrupt. The police do not 
respond immediately when crime is reported. There are incidents where police do not arrest 
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crime suspects and if they do, crime suspects are sometimes released without charges.  
Parents and other community members show reluctance to sanction children and other 
offenders informally. As a result, individuals normalise crimes and others acquire criminal 
behaviours.  
 
7.4 Community involvement in crime prevention  
All interviewed residents have positive attitudes and perceptions towards the neighbourhood 
watch and they see the approach of patrolling streets as an ideal way for reducing and 
preventing crimes. But none of the informants was a member of the neighbourhood watch 
except one informant who used to be a member. In addition, none of the informants was 
willing to join the neighbourhood watch in the near future. They claimed that they cannot 
patrol streets as a volunteer while there are police who are employed by the government to 
maintain the security and who get paid for the service they provide. However, the major 
reason why some residents are not willing to participate in patrolling streets is poverty. The 
informants postulate that they cannot volunteer while they struggle to put food on the table 
for their families.  
 
In terms of fighting crime informally, residents of Site B as a whole were blamed by all 
informants for failing to apply informal social controls such as condemnation against 
offenders. Parents however, were blamed most since many crimes are committed by youths 
who are supposed to be guided and controlled by their parents. Rather, parents let their 
children free to behave and do what they feel is good for them instead of giving guidance. 
Other offenders are often not condemned or punished informally. Even if individuals commit 
crime in public, some residents keep quiet and pass or stand aside to watch the event as 
spectators. This indicates that Site B experiences low quality social capital which is a core 
component of solidarity and collectiveness. Rather, the individualism prevails in the 
community as one prominent informant, the deputy of secretary of Khayelitsha Safety and 
Security Forum acknowledged that criminals take advantage of the fragmentation of 
Khayelitsha residents. Again, this fragmentation is an indication that residents of Site B do 
not live ubuntu which would also teach the residents to care for each other as members of one 
family.  
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The use of informal sanctions however, is very controversial. All informants blame the South 
African laws which discourage parents and the whole community from applying some 
informal sanctions which is regarded as taking the law into their own hands. Captain Van der 
Vyver admitted that some informal sanctions such as sjambokking, assaulting or beating 
crime suspects are criminalised by law irrespective whether offenders were wrong or not. The 
implication here is that all crimes have to be reported to the police but the problem is that 
formal sanctions are not effective in deterring individuals from committing crime. The 
ineffectiveness of formal sanctions is reflected in the vigilant killings of alleged criminals in 
Khayelitsha. Members of the community have lost trust and confidence in the police and the 
criminal justice system.  
 
7.5 Empowerment of residents  
The implementation of programmes such as CPF and visible policing in Khayelitsha was a 
good attempt at improving security and safety in the community but these programmes face 
numerous challenges. CPF for example, encounters financial problems in its operations to 
capacitate its volunteers with equipment and necessary skills so they become competent. The 
Secretary of CPF in Site B, Nomawethu Mosuna acknowledged that their volunteers are not 
trained to fight crime and need radios to communicate with police or between themselves, 
rather than using their cell phones. She added that stipends are needed so volunteers can buy 
their daily needs and necessary equipment such as boots and jackets without using their own 
money. If people struggle to meet their basic needs, they may not be willing to volunteer. 
Asking them to buy or use their little resources on voluntary work therefore, is likely to 
reduce the number of potential volunteers in CPFs.   
Addressing root causes of crime was given negligible attention by all crime prevention 
programmes in Khayelitsha. Both visible policing and CPF programmes seem to focus 
mainly on reducing the number of crime incidents without tackling the root causes of crime 
such as poverty or reducing crime opportunities. All informants acknowledged that crime is 
high in areas with poor infrastructure such as informal houses, and limited streets and lights. 
Residents are not capacitated economically and socio-economically to control and maintain 
security in their areas. In lieu of tackling crime problems by rooting out the causes of crime 
and reducing crime incidents, the police and crime prevention programmes in Site B 
concentrate their efforts and resources on crime incidents reduction. Poverty which is one of 
the major factors that forces individuals to commit crimes remains unaddressed. The physical 
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environment in which the residents live is not designed in such a way that it reduces crime 
opportunities. Some areas are crowded with informal houses, streets and lights are limited 
and the majority of the residents live in poverty. If these issues are not addressed effectively, 
crime will continue to prevail in Site B.  
 7.6 Cooperation between residents and police  
Allegations of the ineffectiveness and corruption in the SAPS ruin the cooperation between 
police and residents to the extent that some residents see the police as enemies. These 
unfriendly attitudes and perceptions of residents towards police were confirmed by all 
interviewed residents who reiterated by saying that they have lost confidence and trust in the 
SAPS. Consequently, some residents do not report crime-related information to the police as 
reporting is regarded as a waste of time.      
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